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There are few sorrows, however poignant, in which a good income is of no avail.
Logan Pearsall Smith (1865-1946)1
TRUSTEES HAVE LONG struggled with the duty to balance the in-
terests of current and future beneficiaries of a trust. As modern port-
folio investment techniques and laws encourage trustees to invest for
total return, trust legislation has developed that empowers trustees to
mitigate the inequitable effects to beneficiaries of this investment ap-
proach. Key legislation includes the Uniform Principal and Income
Act,2 unitrust statutes, the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act.3 and private foundation tax compliance statutes. This Arti-
cle explains why these acts are important in the context of current
investment practices and laws, details the different approaches, and
compares them. It concludes by suggesting a broadening of the appli-
cation of these laws, including the extension of the Uniform Manage-
ment of Institutional Funds Act to non-institutional trustees.
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Introduction
Sharing is hard. In a trust, the current and future interest holders
must share the risk and return of the investments of the trust, and the
parties may disagree vigorously about what investment and fiduciary
policies are in their own individual best interests. The delicate role of
the trustee is to balance these interests, administering the trust fairly
and in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable fiduciary
law.
Fiduciary law is gradually evolving to allow trustees to invest and
manage trust funds in ways that allow them to balance these compet-
ing interests more efficiently. The widespread passage of the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act 4 and the acceptance of its underlying precepts of
modern portfolio theory have encouraged trustees to invest trust as-
sets with a goal of maximizing total return-the optimal amount of
gain for the trust given its risk/reward tolerance, regardless of
whether the gain is classified for trust accounting purposes as income
or principal. Although this investment approach may maximize the
financial success of the trust as a whole, it exacerbates the conflict
between the income beneficiaries and the remaindermen, who have
strong preferences about whether the character of the receipt from
the investment lands in the "income" account or the "principal"
account.
The conflict between the present and future interests is serious,
and the trustee has a duty to appropriately balance these inherently
competing interests. As section 183 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
succinctly provides, "When there are two or more beneficiaries of a
trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them. ' 5 A
trustee must struggle to structure the trust's investments to balance
the investment desires of the current and future beneficiaries. 6
Adhering to the duty of impartiality is no simple task. While con-
forming to the fundamental fiduciary duty of impartiality, the trustee
must also conform to a general standard of prudent investment. 7 Sec-
tion 227 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts dictates that "[t] he trustee
4. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr, 7B U.L.A. 281 (1994).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959). Restatements are produced and
approved by the American Law Institute and are intended to state the common law of the
United States on particular fields of law. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements
and Trends in American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2000).
6. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 387-88 (6th ed. 1987); Jeffrey A. Zaluda, Dealing
with Controversy: A Trustee's Investment Dilemma, 44 TAx MGMT. MEMO. 155, 155 (May 5,
2003).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992).
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is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds of
the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms,
distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust."8 The
comments to section 227 of the Restatement (Third) note that the inter-
ests of a life income beneficiary "are almost inherently in competition
with those of the remainder beneficiaries .... These conflicting fidu-
ciary obligations result in a necessarily flexible and somewhat indefi-
nite duty of impartiality. The duty requires the trustee to balance the
competing interests of differently situated beneficiaries in a fair and
reasonable manner."9
Being "fair and reasonable" is challenging when one beneficiary
is clamoring for investments producing interest, rents, dividends, and
other traditional trust accounting income and the remaindermen are
arguing for growth investments. Balancing these desires has become
even more intricate in recent years because the income yield from
stocks and bonds has plummeted dramatically over the past two de-
cades-perhaps as much as seventy percent. 10
The need to produce returns that fall neatly and fairly into the
categories of trust accounting income and principal is extremely chal-
lenging when faced with the requirements of the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act and the concept of total return investing. Traditional in-
come-only trusts are often simply incompatible with efficient invest-
ing. As noted by commentators Patrick Collins and Josh Stampfi,
"Traditional trust structures force an extreme and unproductive con-
servatism on trustees the result of which is either a slow erosion of
purchasing power for current beneficiaries or a staggering opportu-
nity cost for remaindermen.'
Fortunately, state legislatures around the country are taking ac-
tion to enhance a trustee's ability to administer an income-only trust
in accordance with the realities of modern investment. Most states al-
low trustees at least one statutory method by which they can attempt
to balance the interests of the current and future beneficiaries, and
8. Id.
9. Id. at cmt. c.
10. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Toots for Better Balancing the Interests of Income Beneficiaries
and Remaindermen, 28 TAx MGMT. EST., Girrs & TR. J. 244, 244 (2003). For an additional
discussion of the change in bond yields over the past few decades and their implications
for total return trusts, see Lyman W. Welch, Brave New World of Total Return Laws, 141 TR. &
EsT. 24 (2002). The current S&P 500 average dividend yield is only about 1.9%, well be-
low the historic average of 4% since 1936. SeeJonathan Fuerbringer, Companies with Cash
Hoards Don't Necessarily Pay It Out, N.Y. TiMES, July 22, 2004, at CL.
11. Patrick J. Collins & Josh Stampfli, Promises and Pitfalls of Total Return Trusts, 27
ACTECJ. 205, 207 (2001).
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many states offer several approaches.1 2 These approaches include the
power to adjust under the Uniform Principal and Income Act, uni-
trust statutes, the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act,
state statutes authorizing private foundation trustees to distribute
principal to meet Internal Revenue Code minimum distribution re-
quirements, and a unique state-specific approach: section 8113 of the
Pennsylvania Statutes.
This Article reviews the status of a trustee's investment guidelines
under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and related investment theo-
ries. It then discusses each of the major legislative techniques available
to a trustee for balancing the interests of present and future benefi-
ciaries when investing for total return. It compares these approaches,
using a hypothetical example, to show the effects of the various tech-
niques. Finally, it draws conclusions from the synthesis of this informa-
tion and suggests the broadening of available techniques for the
future.
I. The Evolution of the Prudent Investor
The investment standards applied to trustees have changed with
the times. The trustee, who was once expected to behave as a "pru
dent man," is now referred to as a "prudent investor."' 3 This shift in-
volves more than terminology as the focus on legal lists and secure
investments has given way to modern concepts of investing. 14 Modern
investment techniques are the inspiration for and the reason behind
statutes allowing trustees flexibility in balancing the interests of cur-
rent and future beneficiaries. This section explains the development
of investment standards and the tension they create for trustees.
A. The Prudent Man Rule
In the nineteenth century, trustees were first held to a "prudent
man rule" standard of investment, which became the majority rule in
the 1940s. The prudent man rule was formulated in 1830 by the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Harvard College v. Amory. 15 In Am-
ory, the trustees were sued by the charitable remainder beneficiaries
for failing to protect the capital by investing in manufacturing and
12. See infra apps. A-C.
13. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992), and UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1, 7B U.L.A. 286
(1994).
14. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 281 (1994).
15. 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830).
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insurance stocks.1 6 In dicta, the court laid out the oft-quoted prudent
man rule:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall con-
duct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable in-
come, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
17
Even in the early years of its application, courts recognized that
the definition of a prudent man may change over time. 18 In the 1919
case of Kimball v. Whitney, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
reaffirmed the rule and expanded upon it as follows:
Good faith and sound discretion, as these terms ought to be under-
stood by reasonable men of good judgment, were thus made the
standard by which the conduct of trustees is to be measured. That
is a comprehensive principle. It is wide in its scope. It is not limited
to a particular time or a special neighborhood. It is general and
inclusive, so that while remaining fixed, it may continue to be a
safeguard under new financial institutions and business customs,
changed commercial methods and practices, altered monetary us-
ages and investment combinations. It avoids the inflexibility of def-
inite classification of securities, it disregards the optimism of the
promoter, and eschews the exuberance of the speculator. It holds
fast to common sense and depends on practical experience. It is
susceptible of being adapted to whatever conditions may arise in
the evolution of society and the progress of civilization.'
9
The prudent man rule was widely accepted in the United States. 20
It was eventually adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, pub-
lished in 1959.21 Section 227 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts pro-
vides that the trustee's duty is "to make such investments and only
such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property
having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and reg-
ularity of the income to be derived."2 2 This was a default rule that
could be preempted by either a trust instrument or statute. 23 Al-
though the Restatement (Second) of Trusts includes a duty to diversify,
the prudence of each investment was to be determined individually. 24
16. Id. at 459-60.
17. Id. at 461.
18. See Kimball v. Whitney, 123 N.E. 665, 666 (Mass. 1919).
19. Id.
20. See 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 227.5 (4th ed. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. p (1959).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id. §§ 227 cmt. o, 228.
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Essentially, this standard "requires diversification, but only among un-
speculative investments because none other is permitted.
25
The case of Chase v. Pevear26 is an example of a typical application
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts version of the prudent man rule.2 7
In this case, the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust questioned vari-
ous investments made by the trustee. 28 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court restated the prudent man rule from Harvard College v.
Amory and noted that it would not classify particular categories of in-
vestments as imprudent.29 According to the court, "The trustee must
exercise prudence in making or retaining each investment ....
The court went on to examine seven different investments to deter-
mine whether or not each one was speculative, without any reference
to its role in the overall portfolio.31 The court did recognize the need
to diversify trust funds, but only to avoid over-investing in a single type
of stock or bond.3 2
As anticipated by the Massachusetts court in Kimball v. Whitney,
the standard for trustees had to change with the times. 33 The old rule
was criticized as outdated and overly conservative. 34 The time had
come for a reform, or as some would argue, a return to the more
flexible standard envisioned by the court in Harvard College v. Amory as
opposed to "specific rules derived from specific cases." 35
B. Contemporary Investment Theories
Changes in investment theory have shaped the evolution of stan-
dards of modern investment, leading to the current prudent investor
rule.36 Two of the key underpinnings of contemporary investment
25. Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule For Trustee Investment and Modem Portfolio
Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87, 94 (1990).
26. 419 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1981).
27. See id. at 1365.
28. See id. at 1362.
29. See id. at 1365; Amory, 26 Mass. at 461.
30. Chase, 419 N.E.2d at 1366.
31. See id. at 1366-69.
32. See id. at 1366.
33. See Kimball v. Whitney, 123 N.E. 665, 666 (Mass. 1919).
34. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 52, 61 (1987); Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Manage-
ment Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 723 (1976).
35. Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modem Portfolio Theory, and Private Trusts:
Drafting and Administration Including the "Give Me Five" Unitrust, 33 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 1, 6 (1998).
36. See Robert B. Wolf, Defeating the Duty to Disappoint Equally-The Total Return Trust,
32 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. 45, 52-53 (1997) [hereinafter Wolf, Defeating the Duty]; John H.
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practices are modern portfolio theory and total return investing. 37
Each of these concepts has influenced the current law on appropriate
trust investments, which in turn has influenced the development of
statutory fiduciary powers that enable trustees to administer trusts
fairly under these modern investment concepts. This section provides
a summary of modern portfolio theory and total return investing.38
The foundation of modern portfolio theory rests on two basic
principles: (1) higher risk should result in a higher rate of return and
(2) capital markets are basically efficient. 39 The first principle dictates
that an investor should examine risk and return in light of the overall
portfolio.40 Risk is classified as either market risk or nonmarket risk. 41
Market risk is the risk of lower return that affects all securities and is
dictated by economic and political conditions. 42 Generally, greater
market risk correlates with greater return. 43 Nonmarket risk is the risk
that a particular asset or industry will not perform as well as antici-
pated. 44 An example of nonmarket risk is a particular company's stock
plummeting after the departure of key members of its board of direc-
tors. Since this event would not affect the market as a whole, the best
protection against this risk is diversification. 45 Thus, according to
modern portfolio theory, "the gains in one investment will cancel out
the losses in another. '46 In contrast to the standard set forth in the
prudent man rule of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, modern portfo-
lio theory permits investment in a speculative stock that is part of a
diversified portfolio. 47
Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REv.
641, 642 (1996).
37. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 17
(1998).
38. A thorough examination of these concepts is beyond the scope of this Article. For
more detailed information, the reader should consult the following authorities: JONATHAN
R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY (1998); BEVIs LONGSTRETH,
MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986); BURTON G.
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET (5th ed. 1990).
39. See Horn, supra note 35, at 12.
40. See MACEY, supra note 37, at 17.
41. See id. at 20-21.
42. See id. at 23; Martin D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent Investor Need the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act-An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 ME. L. REv. 28, 33-34 (1999).
43. See MACEY, supra note 37, at 23.
44. See id. at 22. This category also includes risks to particular industries that may
include more than one company. Id.
45. See id. at 23.
46. See id. at 21-22.
47. See Haskell, supra note 25, at 103.
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The second concept behind modern portfolio theory is that capi-
tal markets are basically efficient.48 Importantly, this assertion leads to
the conclusion that an individual investor selecting a portfolio should
not be able to achieve a greater return than the market in general.
49
The rationale is that the cost of each security reflects all of the public
information about that security.50 Since no individual can consistently
predict future performance before the market adjusts, it is impossible
to outperform the market.51 Therefore, modem portfolio theory not
only permits passive investments (such as index funds), but it actually
questions the use of more costly active management, which may be
unable to achieve greater returns.52
In addition to modern portfolio theory, a key component of cur-
rent investment philosophy is total return investing. Total return in-
vesting means that assets are invested for maximum overall return,
without regard to income and principal. 53 Economic changes over the
last century spurred the development of the total return approach to
investing.5 4 At the time the prudent man rule was developing, trustees
were concerned with preserving capital and "were inclined to empha-
size long-term government and corporate bonds as the characteristic
trust investment. ' 55 Post-World War II inflation resulted in losses in
bond values and trustees responded by slowly adding equity invest-
ments.56 Inflation rates began to fluctuate significantly after the late
1960s, and the total return concept began to flourish as trustees real-
ized that to sustain the actual value of the trust principal, the trust
needed to grow at the inflation rate. 57
48. See MAcEN, supra note 37, at 37-38.
49. See id. at 38-43; Horn, supra note 35, at 16.
50. See Langbein, supra note 36, at 657.
51. See id. Langbein posits that this does not mean that professional investment man-
agers are "incompetent bunglers, indeed, just the opposite. They are so good at what they
do that they effectively cancel each other out." Id.
52. See Haskell, supra note 25, at 94. Haskell notes that passive investment is not per-
mitted under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 227. Id. But seeJohn H. Langbein &
Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1
(1976); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II,
1977 Am. B. FoUND. RES. J. 1 (1977).
53. See id.
54. See Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36, at 53.
55. Langbein, supra note 36, at 645.
56. See id.
57. Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36, at 53.
[Vol. 39
FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF TRUST BENEFICIARIES
C. The Prudent Investor Rule
The 1990s marked a major change to the now-titled "prudent in-
vestor rule" with the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act ("UPIA") .58 These new versions
represented a significant change in the way the old standard of pru-
dence was applied in practice and incorporated the more modern ap-
proaches of modern portfolio theory and total return investing.5 9
In 1990, a revised "prudent investor rule" was adopted by the
American Law Institute as part of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.60
Section 227 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts requires a trustee to use
"reasonable care, skill and caution" with respect to the trust portfolio
as a whole, in contrast to the prior Restatement's focus on individual
investments. 61 The trustee's duty to diversify is now considered "fun-
damental. ' 62 Additionally, the standard established by the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts only applies in the absence of direction from the trust
instrument or a controlling statute. 63 A majority of states have
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992); UNIF. PRUDENT INvESTOR ACT,
7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1997).
59. See Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36, at 63-66. One commentator has sug-
gested that the version of the rule adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts was too liberal
and that it disregards the goals of private trusts. See Haskell, supra note 25, at 110-11.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992).
61. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992). The new rule provides as follows:
§ 227. General Standard of Prudent Investment
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds of
the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.
(a) This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, and
is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust
portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should incorporate
risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.
(b) In making and implementing investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to
diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is pru-
dent not to do so.
(c) In addition, the trustee must:
(1) conform to fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty (§170) and impartial-
ity (§183);
(2) act with prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate authority
and in the selection and supervision of agents (§171); and
(3) incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate to the
investment responsibilities of the trusteeship (§188).
(d) The trustee's duties under this Section are subject to the rule of §228, deal-
ing primarily with contrary investment provisions of a trust or statute.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992).
62. Id. § 227, cmt. f(3).
63. See id. § 228.
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adopted statutes based on the UPIA, and these statutes take prece-
dence over the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.64
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws issued the Uniform Prudent Investor Act in 1994.65 As of 2004,
some version of the UPIA has been enacted in thirty-nine states and
the District of Columbia.66 The prefatory note to the UPIA acknowl-
edges the influence of modern portfolio theory and the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts.6 7 This note highlights five "fundamental alterations"
to the rule: (1) the prudence of an investment is evaluated as part of
the total portfolio; (2) a trustee's "central consideration" is the trade-
off of risk and return; (3) there is no list of categories of investments
that are prohibited; (4) a prudent investor is required to diversify; and
(5) trustees are now permitted to delegate investment and manage-
ment functions. 68 Section 1 of the UPIA establishes the scope of the
rule by stating that its provisions are only default rules and that the
terms of the trust instrument control.69
The essence of the UPIA lies in section 2, which sets out the pru-
dent investor standard.70 Section 2(a) directs that "[a] trustee shall
invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by consid-
ering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other cir-
cumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall
exercise reasonable, care, skill and caution."' 7 1 Section 2(b) incorpo-
64. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1, 7B U.L.A. 280 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at prefatory note.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 1, at 286.
70. Id. § 2, at 289-90.
71. Id. The full text of section 2 reads as follows:
(a) A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circum-
stances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasona-
ble, care, skill and caution.
(b) A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual as-
sets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a
whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objec-
tives reasonably suited to the trust.
(c) Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider in investing and managing
trust assets are such of the following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
(1) general economic conditions;
(2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(3) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
(4) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall
trust portfolio, *hich may include financial assets, interests in closely held enter-
prises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property;
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rates modern portfolio theory by stating that the standard applies to
the risk and return of the overall portfolio and not to individual in-
vestments. 72 The UPIA provides further guidance for trustees by in-
cluding a list of circumstances that may be considered when making
investments, 73 but the official commentary to the UPIA explains that
this list is not meant to be exclusive.74 The UPLA also emphasizes that
no type of investment is automatically prohibited. 75 The commentary
acknowledges that the character of investments changes over time and
that it is "the trustee's task to invest at a risk level that is suitable to the
purposes of the trust."76
The duty to diversify is now a central requirement of prudent in-
vesting under section 3 of the UPIA. 77 The reason for diversifying is to
reduce nonmarket risk, as described in modern portfolio theory.78
The trustee is released from this duty if special circumstances out-
weigh the advantages of diversification. 79
The next several sections of the UPIA simply codify well-estab-
lished rules applicable to trustees. Section 4 provides that a trustee
shall take action necessary to conform the trust assets with the pru-
dence standard "within a reasonable time."80 Sections 5 and 6 affirm
(5) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital;
(6) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or apprecia-
tion of capital; and
(8) an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of
the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.
(d) A trustee shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the invest-
ment and management of trust assets.
(e) A trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent
with the standards of this [Act].
(f) A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance
upon the trustee's representation that the trustee has special skills or expertise,
has a duty to use those special skills or expertise.
Id.
72. Id. § 2(b), at 290.
73. Id. § 2(c), at 290.
74. Id. § 2 cmt., at 290.
75. Id. § 2(e), at 290.
76. Id. § 2 cmt., at 290.
77. See id. § 3, at 296 ("A trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the
trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the
trust are better served without diversifying.").
78. See id. § 3 cmt., at 297.
79. See id. at 296-97. The commentary provides examples of special circumstances
such as a trust holding a block of low-cost basis securities or a retaining a family business.
Id.
80. Id. § 4, at 298.
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the trustee's duty of loyalty and duty of impartiality to the benefi-
ciaries. 81 Section 7 addresses the trustee's obligation to avoid unrea-
sonable costs.8 2 Read in the context of modern portfolio theory, this
section suggests that trustees who actively manage the portfolio in-
stead of investing in index funds may have to demonstrate an increase
in value to the beneficiaries that is commensurate with the increase in
cost.83 Section 8 provides trustees with some comfort by stating that
their actions will be evaluated "in light of the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of the trustee's decision or action and not by hind-
sight."84 There was no corollary to this section in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts.85
Section 9 of the UPIA represents a major shift in prior law by
authorizing a trustee to delegate investment and management du-
ties.86 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts prohibited trustees from dele-
gating any duties that required the trustee to exercise discretion. 87
The commentary to the UPIA notes that more recent legislation has
supported the right of a trustee to delegate some functions, but warns
that the beneficiary must be protected against unreasonable delega-
tion.88 Section 9 "is designed to strike the appropriate balance be-
tween the advantages and the hazards of delegation" by imposing a
duty of care on the trustee when choosing what and to whom to
delegate. 89
Both the UPIA and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts impose upon
the trustee a duty to invest prudently, consistent with current invest-
ment tenets, including modern portfolio theory and total return in-
vesting.90 Gone is the duty to invest "as a prudent man ... having in
view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of
the income to be derived," as well as the incentive to focus on the
production of trust accounting income. 91 Instead, trustees are empow-
ered to invest more efficiently, more aggressively, and more diversely.
81. Id. §§ 5-6, at 299-300.
82. Id. § 7, at 301.
83. See Horn, supra note 35, at 17.
84. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 8, 7B U.L.A. 302 (2000).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 227-29 (1959).
86. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, 78 U.L.A. 303 (2000).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959) (permitting delegation of "minis-
terial" duties only).
88. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, 78 U.L.A. at 303 cmt.
89. Id.
90. See id. § 2, at 289; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959).
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D. Can a Trustee Be Both Prudent and Impartial?
The rise of the prudent investor rule may have been a boon for
trust beneficiaries in terms of encouraging efficient investment, but it
exacerbated a tension between the interests of the current and future
trust beneficiaries that a trustee is compelled to balance. Trustees are
saddled with a duty of impartiality and must treat the future and in-
come beneficiaries fairly and equitably.92 Income beneficiaries, natu-
rally, have a preference for investments producing trust accounting
income, which will be applied for their benefit.9 3 Remainder benefi-
ciaries, just as naturally, favor investments that increase the value of
the trust corpus.9 4 Trustees must now treat these competing goals im-
partially, while "investing as a prudent investor would.
95
In the current economic environment, it is more difficult than
ever to meet the needs of the income beneficiaries while preserving
the capital of the trust.9 6 The average dividend yield for the Standard
& Poor's 500 was 1.83% in February 2005, compared to an average of
4% since 1936. 97 The ten-year government bond reached a forty-five
year low of 3.11% in June 2003, and some analysts believe that yields
could plunge even more. 98 When viewed as a long-term investment
and compared to fixed income products, equity maintains its value in
the face of inflation and has higher rates of return.9 9 Equity gained an
additional advantage with the enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Act of 2003,100 which reduced the maximum capital gains tax
rate from 20% to 15%. 1o
92. See id. § 183.
93. See Barry L. Kohler, Tru or False: An Introduction to the Total Return Unitrust, 16 ME.
B.J. 94, 95 (Spring 2001) ("Unfortunately, income beneficiaries measure trust perform-
ance by the amount of income received, and remaindermen measure performance by the
appreciation of the value of the corpus (principal). Consequently, both are often disap-
pointed ....").
94. Id.
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1992); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr
§ 2(a), 7B U.L.A. 289 (1994).
96. See Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36 at 50-51; Joel C. Dobris, New Forms of
Private Trusts for the Twenty-First Century-Principal and Income, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
1, 3 (Spring 1996).
97. See Fuerbringer, supra note 10, at C7; Markets Lineup, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2005, at
C2.
98. SeeJennifer Ablan, Current Yield: Di'd Vu All Over Again for Bonds, BRRON'S, Mar.
15, 2004, at MW14. This benchmark was yielding 4.149% as of September 13, 2004. Aaron
Lucchetti, Indebted Consumers Reshape the Bond Market, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2004, at Cl.
99. See Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36, at 53, 57-58.
100. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
101. I.R.C. § I(h)(1)(C) (2004), amended &y Jobs and Growth Act § 301(a) (2) (A)
(2003).
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These trends make it difficult for trustees to generate income as it
is traditionally defined. As a result, a traditional approach to invest-
ment by trustees leads to lower overall returns. 10 2 Total return invest-
ing recognizes that "return can come in many forms, including capital
gain." 103 This school of thought rejects the practice of labeling return
as either income or principal. 10 4 For trust beneficiaries, however,
these labels are important because of their effect on distributions.
The responsibility of the trustee is to balance these competing
duties to the full extent of its ability. 105 While this is challenging, re-
cent developments in fiduciary law are making this task more manage-
able. The flexibility provided by these developments is critically
needed by trustees who find themselves investing between a rock (pru-
dent investment) and a hard place (impartial treatment of current
and future interests).
H. Legislation Allowing Trust Distribution Flexibility
In the face of the realities of balancing modern investment tech-
niques and beneficiary needs, state legislatures have enacted various
statutes that allow trustees a more flexible approach to trusts that base
payments on trust accounting income.10 6 Although modern drafters
can alleviate several of the problems caused by income-only trusts by
drafting for principal invasion in some trusts, a significant number of
existing trusts continue to be constrained by income-only provisions.
The income-only provisions often cannot be eliminated, either be-
cause the trust is irrevocable or because the provisions are necessary
to obtain certain tax benefits, leaving many trusts confined to these
provisions and the lack of flexibility they entail.10 7 In response, state
legislatures have created an assortment of techniques that allow trust-
ees to alter the amounts paid to income beneficiaries. While legislative
102. See Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36, at 51.
103. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, University, and Foun-
dation Decisions on Annual Spending From Endowments: A Visit to the World of Spending Rules, 28
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.J. 49, 53 (1993).
104. See id.
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. c, at 13 (1992).
106. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA, FIDUCIARY LAw SECTION, REPORT OF THE FLEXIBLE INCOME
TRUST COMMITTEE (July 10, 2002), available at http://www.gabar.org/fidnews.asp (last ac-
cessed Jan. 9, 2005), provides a thoughtful analysis of the role of the power to adjust and
the unitrust option in the context of current prudent investment law.
107. For example, certain trusts for minors, marital deduction trusts, and qualified sub-
chapter S trusts are required by tax law to distribute all of their income to the benefici-
ary. See I.R.C. § 2503 (c) (2004) (minor's trusts); I.R.C. § 2056(b) (2004) (marital trusts); and
I.R.C. § 1361 (d) (3) (B) (2004) (qualified subchapter S trusts).
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approaches vary greatly in scope and applicability, all share the char-
acteristic of supporting a trustee in observing the prudent investor
rule and investing for total return.
Each legislative approach has its own strengths and weaknesses,
and some are better suited for certain types of trusts. The following
section explains the various approaches to balance the interests of cur-
rent and future trust beneficiaries offered by state legislatures and ex-
plores the pros and cons of each technique. The five approaches that
will be considered in this section include (A) the power to adjust
under the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act; (B) the ability to
convert to a unitrust; (C) the appropriation of appreciation under the
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act; (D) the authoriza-
tion of distribution of principal from private foundation trusts to meet
minimum distribution requirements of the Internal Revenue Code
(called "private foundation tax compliance statutes"); and (E) an unu-
sual state-specific approach: section 8113 of the Pennsylvania Statutes.
A. Power to Adjust Under the Uniform Principal and Income Act
Perhaps the most dramatic development in the past decade for
trustees seeking to balance the financial interests of beneficiaries has
been the power to adjust receipts and expenses between income and
principal under the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act. The
power to adjust applies to trusts that define payments to beneficiaries
based on income. A version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act
already has been enacted in a majority of states, and although this
legislation is fairly recent, its impact is likely to be substantial.108 The
power to adjust is a key enabler of total return investment. 109
108. Appendix A to this Article also lists the states that have enacted the 1997 Principal
and Income Act as stated in Uniform Laws Annotated, but given the Act's continuing pro-
gress in many jurisdictions, print lists become outdated quickly. To determine whether a
state has enacted the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act, visit the website of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") at http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=60 (last accessed Sept.
22, 2004). The Leimberg website is also a helpful resource. See LEIMBERG & LECLAIR, INC.,
TRUs (TOTAL RETURN UNITRUSTS):JURISDIcTIONS HAVING ENACTED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME ACT, at http://www.leimberg.com/freeResources/truStates.asp#ma (last accessed
Sept. 22, 2004).
109. See UNI. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104, 7B U.L.A. 141 (2000). The comment to
the Act provides insight on the contribution of the adjustment power to the trustee's ability
to manage a trustee impartially and productively, and provides as follows:
Impartiality and productivity of income. The duty of impartiality between income
and remainder beneficiaries is linked to the trustee's duty to make the portfolio
productive of trust accounting income whenever the distribution requirements
are expressed in terms of distributing the trust's "income." ... Under the prudent
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Section 104 of the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act grants
trustees the ability to alter the amount paid to current beneficiaries by
adjusting receipts and expenses between income and principal, allevi-
ating the restraints of trust accounting definitions of income and prin-
cipal.1 10 The Act provides:
A trustee may adjust between principal and income to the extent
the trustee considers necessary if the trustee invests and manages
trust assets as a prudent investor, the terms of the trust describe the
amount that may or must be distributed to a beneficiary by refer-
ring to the trust's income, and the trustee determines, after apply-
ing the rules in Section 103(a), that the trustee is unable to comply
with Section 103(b). 111
investor rule, "[t]o whatever extent a requirement of income productivity exists
•.. the requirement applies not investment by investment but to the portfolio as a
whole." . . . The power to adjust under Section 104(a) is also to be exercised by
considering net income from the portfolio as a whole and not investment by in-
vestment .... While the purpose of the power to adjust in Section 104(a) is to
eliminate the need for a trustee who operates under the prudent investor rule to
be concerned about the income component of the portfolio's total return, the
trustee must still determine the extent to which a distribution must be made to an
income beneficiary and the adequacy of the portfolio's liquidity as a whole to
make that distribution.
Id. at 144-45 cmt.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 104(a), at 141. The comment to the Act provides detail on these three pre-
requisites to exercising the power to adjust:
Three conditions to the exercise of the power to adjust. The first of the three
conditions that must be met before a trustee can exercise the power to adjust-
that the trustee invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor-is expressed
in this Act by language derived from the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, but the
condition will be met whether the prudent investor rule applies because the Uni-
form Act or other prudent investor legislation has been enacted, the prudent
investor rule has been approved by the courts, or the terms of the trust require it.
Even if a State's legislature or courts have not formally adopted the rule, the
Restatement establishes the prudent investor rule as an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the common law prudent man rule, referring to the prudent investor rule
as a "modest reformulation of the Harvard College dictum and the basic rule of
prior Restatements." Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule, Introduc-
tion, at 5. As a result, there is a basis for concluding that the first condition is
satisfied in virtually all States except those in which a trustee is permitted to invest
only in assets set forth in a statutory "legal list." The second condition will be met
when the terms of the trust require all of the "income" to be distributed at regular
intervals; or when the terms of the trust require a trustee to distribute all of the
income, but permit the trustee to decide how much to distribute to each member
of a class of beneficiaries; or when the terms of a trust provide that the beneficiary
shall receive the greater of the trust accounting income and a fixed dollar
amount (an annuity), or of trust accounting income and a fractional share of the
value of the trust assets (a unitrust amount). If the trust authorizes the trustee in
its discretion to distribute the trust's income to the beneficiary or to accumulate
some or all of the income, the condition will be met because the terms of the
[Vol. 39
FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF TRUST BENEFICIARIES
For example, a trustee of a $1,000,000 trust with a 2% ($20,000)
return on income-producing investments and a 7% ($70,000) return
on equity investments may exercise the power to adjust to make distri-
butions in excess of trust accounting income by transferring a reason-
able amount (say $15,000) from principal to income. The trustee
could then distribute to the income beneficiary the trust accounting
income ($20,000) plus the amount adjusted from principal ($15,000),
for a greater total distribution ($35,000). When exercising its discre-
tion, the trustee will be guided by any limits in the applicable state
statute.
According to the Act's comment, the purpose of this power "is to
enable a trustee to select investments using the standards of a prudent
investor without having to realize a particular portion of the portfo-
lio's total return in the form of traditional trust accounting income
such as interest, dividends, and rents."112
Section 103(a) of the Uniform Principal and Income Act requires
that a fiduciary: (1) shall administer a trust or estate in accordance
with the terms of the trust or the will, even if there is a different provi-
sion in the Principal and Income Act; (2) may administer a trust or
estate by the exercise of a discretionary power of administration given
to the fiduciary by the terms of the trust or the will, even if the exer-
cise of the power produces a outcome different from a result required
or permitted by the Principal and Income Act; (3) shall administer a
trust or estate in accordance with the Principal and Income Act if the
terms of the trust or the will do not contain a different provision or do
not give the fiduciary a discretionary power of administration; and (4)
trust do not permit the trustee to distribute more than the trust accounting in-
come. To meet the third condition, the trustee must first meet the requirements
of Section 103(a), i.e., she must apply the terms of the trust, decide whether to
exercise the discretionary powers given to the trustee under the terms of the trust,
and must apply the provisions of the Act if the terms of the trust do not contain a
different provision or give the trustee discretion. Second, the trustee must deter-
mine the extent to which the terms of the trust clearly manifest an intention by
the settlor that the trustee may or must favor one or more of the beneficiaries. To
the extent that the terms of the trust do not require partiality, the trustee must
conclude that she is unable to comply with the duty to administer the trust impar-
tially. To the extent that the terms of the trust do require or permit the trustee to
favor the income beneficiary or the remainder beneficiary, the trustee must con-
clude that she is unable to achieve the degree of partiality required or permitted.
If the trustee comes to either conclusion-that she is unable to administer the
trust impartially or that she is unable to achieve the degree of partiality required
or permitted-she may exercise the power to adjust under Section 104(a).
Id. at 144 cmt.
112. Id. § 104(a) cmt., at 143.
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shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to principal to the extent
that the terms of the trust and the Principal and Income Act do not
provide a rule for allocating the receipt or disbursement to or be-
tween principal and income.' 1 3 Section 103(b) requires that a fiduci-
ary shall administer a trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair
and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries.' 1 4 An exception to this re-
quirement exists if the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest an
intention that the fiduciary shall or may favor one or more of the
beneficiaries. 1 5
The Act sets forth several factors that a trustee should consider in
deciding whether the power to adjust should be exercised, and if so,
to what extent.' 16 The list is not exclusive, and a trustee is expected to
consider all relevant facts and circumstances of the trust and its bene-
ficiaries. These factors are consistent, to a large degree, with the fac-
tors a trustee should consider under the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act. 117
113. See id. § 103(a), at 139.
114. See id. § 103(b), at 140.
115. See id.
116. See id. § 104(b), at 142. These factors include (1) the nature, purpose, and ex-
pected duration of the trust; (2) the intent of the settlor; (3) the identity and circum-
stances of the beneficiaries; (4) the needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and
preservation and appreciation of capital; (5) the assets held in the trust, including (a) the
extent to which they consist of financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises, tangible
and intangible personal property, or real property, (b) the extent to which an asset is used
by a beneficiary, and (c) whether an asset was purchased by the trustee or received from
the settlor; (6) the net amount allocated to income under the other sections of the Princi-
pal and Income Act and the increase or decrease in the value of the principal assets, which
the trustee may estimate as to assets for which market values are not readily available; (7)
whether and to what extent the terms of the trust give the trustee the power to invade
principal or accumulate income or prohibit the trustee from invading principal or ac-
cumulating income, and the extent to which the trustee has exercised a power from time
to time to invade principal or accumulate income; (8) the actual and anticipated effect of
economic conditions on principal and income and effects of inflation and deflation; and
(9) the anticipated tax consequences of an adjustment. Id.
117. The comment to section 104 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act includes
the following statement:
Section 104(b) requires a trustee to consider factors relevant to the trust and its
beneficiaries in deciding whether and to what extent the power to adjust should
be exercised. Section 2(c) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act sets forth circum-
stances that a trustee is to consider in investing and managing trust assets. The
circumstances in Section 2(c) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act are the source
of the factors in paragraphs (3) through (6) and (8) of Section 104(b) (modified
where necessary to adapt them to the purposes of this Act) so that, to the extent
possible, comparable factors will apply to investment decisions and decisions in-
volving the power to adjust. If a trustee who is operating under the prudent inves-
tor rule decides that the portfolio should be composed of financial assets whose
total return will result primarily from capital appreciation rather than dividends,
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The Uniform Principal and Income Act also sets forth a series of
circumstances under which a trustee is forbidden from making an ad-
justment. 1 8 These prohibitions are generally intended to ward off un-
wanted tax consequences. For instance, the Uniform Principal and
Income Act provides that a trustee may not make an adjustment that
reduces the actuarial value of the income interest in a trust intended
to qualify a transfer for a gift tax exclusion)t t9 A trustee may also re-
lease the power to adjust, permanently or for a limited period of time,
if the trustee is concerned that holding the power may impose un-
wanted tax burdens or cause problems along the lines of the list
above. ' 20
interest, and rents, the trustee can decide at the same time the extent to which an
adjustment from principal to income may be necessary under Section 104. On
the other hand, if a trustee decides that the risk and return objectives for the trust
are best achieved by a portfolio whose total return includes interest and dividend
income that is sufficient to provide the income beneficiary with the beneficial
interest to which the beneficiary is entitled under the terms of the trust, the trus-
tee can decide that it is unnecessary to exercise the power to adjust.
Id.
118. See id. § 104(c), at 142. The Act provides:
A trustee may not make an adjustment: (1) that diminishes the income interest in
a trust that requires all of the income to be paid at least annually to a spouse and
for which an estate tax or gift tax marital deduction would be allowed, in whole or
in part, if the trustee did not have the power to make the adjustment; (2) that
reduces the actuarial value of the income interest in a trust to which a person
transfers property with the intent to qualify for a gift tax exclusion; (3) that
changes the amount payable to a beneficiary as a fixed annuity or a fixed fraction
of the value of the trust assets; (4) from any amount that is permanently set aside
for charitable purposes under a will or the terms of a trust unless both income
and principal are so set aside; (5) if possessing or exercising the power to make
an adjustment causes an individual to be treated as the owner of all or part of the
trust for income tax purposes, and the individual would not be treated as the
owner if the trustee did not possess the power to make an adjustment; (6) if
possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes all or part of the
trust assets to be included for estate tax purposes in the estate of an individual
who has the power to remove a trustee or appoint a trustee, or both, and the
assets would not be included in the estate of the individual if the trustee did not
possess the power to make an adjustment; (7) if the trustee is a beneficiary of the
trust; or (8) if the trustee is not a beneficiary, but the adjustment would benefit
the trustee directly or indirectly.
Id.
If any of the last four factors applies to a trustee and there is more than one trustee, a
co-trustee to whom the provision does not apply may make the adjustment unless the exer-
cise of the power by the remaining trustee or trustees is not permitted by the terms of the
trust. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACr § 104(d) (1997), 7B U.L.A. 141, 143 (2000).
119. See id. § 104(c) (2), at 142.
120. See id. § 104(e), at 143.
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The drafters of the Uniform Principal and Income Act intended
the application of the power to adjust to be broad. 121 Although lan-
guage in a trust document may "opt out" of the power to adjust, most
language will be construed to allow application of the Act unless it is
clear that the terms intend to deny the power of adjustment. 122 The
comment to the Act suggests that instruments containing such provi-
sions that are executed after the adoption of this Act should specifi-
cally refer to the power to adjust if the settlor intends to forbid its
use. 1
23
It is important to note that although the Principal and Income
Act is "uniform," states have altered it in a myriad of ways. New Jersey
has an interesting variation on the Principal and Income Act power to
adjust. This state allows its trustees a 4% to 6% safe harbor amount-
much like a unitrust-that will be considered to be prudent. 24 Ohio
provides a 4% safe harbor, 125 and Maryland includes a power to ad-
just, but only up to or down to 4%.126 Colorado 127 and Tennessee 128
121. See id. § 104 cmt., at 143.
122. See id. § 104(f), at 143.
123. See id. § 104 cmt., at 143.
124. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:19B-4 (West 2004) provides:
A decision by a trustee to increase the distribution to the income beneficiary or
beneficiaries in any accounting period to an amount not in excess of four per-
cent, or to decrease that period's distributions to not less than six percent, of the
net fair market value of the trust assets on the first business day of that accounting
period shall be presumed to be fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries.
125. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1340.42(G) (3) (Anderson 2003) provides:
For purposes of this section, and subject to division (C) of this section, from time
to time a trustee may make a safe-harbor adjustment to increase net trust account-
ing income up to and including an amount equal to four per cent of the trust's
fair market value determined as of the first business day of the current year. If a
trustee determines to make this safe-harbor adjustment, the propriety of this ad-
justment shall be conclusively presumed. Nothing in division (G)(3) of this sec-
tion prohibits any other type of adjustment authorized under any provision of this
section.
126. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 15-502.2(c) (2003) provides:
Unless authorized by a court order in accordance with a petition filed under § 15-
502.3 of this subtitle, a trustee may not make an adjustment under subsection (a)
of this section in any accounting period if the adjustment results in a distribution
of net income to the income beneficiary: (1) That is greater than 4% of the net
fair market value of the trust assets on the first business day of that accounting
period, if the net income for that accounting period is less than 4% as deter-
mined under this subtitle before application of the provisions of subsection (a) of
this section; or (2) That is less than 4% of the net fair market value of the trust
assets on the first business day of that accounting period, if the net income for
that accounting period is greater than 4% as determined under this subtitle
before application of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.
127. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-1-404(7) (2001) provides:
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both added a section providing that a trustee has no duty to consider
an adjustment.1 29
Because the power to adjust is new and relatively untested, many
trustees are not comfortable using it and are unsure of the margins of
this new approach. As one commentator puts it, "The boundaries
[under the power to adjust], which will be different for each trust, are
still not clear. Until case law begins to define those boundaries, some
trustees may shy away from exercising this powerful discretionary tool
for fear of lawsuits by the remaindermen. 130 Even the titles of articles
on the power to adjust, including The New Uniform and Principal and
Income Act: Friend or Foe?131 and The Trustee's Power to Invest and to Ad-
just-Attended by No Small Degree of Anxiety and Trouble,132 reflect a cer-
tain degree of discomfort with the new regime.
Despite the apprehension that naturally accompanies change, the
power to adjust holds great promise. It allows trustees a wide range of
flexibility and discretion, enabling payment of not just a fixed dollar
amount but the most appropriate dollar amount given the trust's cir-
cumstances. 133 The amounts distributed to the beneficiaries can vary
each year, with attention given to their needs at the time, unlike the
Nothing in this section or in this part 4 is intended to create or imply a duty to
make an adjustment, and a trustee is not liable for not considering whether to
make an adjustment or for choosing not to make an adjustment. In a proceeding
with respect to a trustee's exercise or nonexercise of the power to make an adjust-
ment under this section, the sole remedy is to direct, deny, or revise an adjust-
ment between principal and income.
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-6-104(g) (2002) provides that "[n]othing in this section [g]
or in this chapter is intended to create or imply a duty to make an adjustment, and a
trustee is not liable for not considering whether to make an adjustment or for choosing not
to make an adjustment."
129. It is also important to note that the power to adjust is but one small section of the
Uniform Principal and Income Act. The Act also covers a variety of other situations rele-
vant to trust allocations that are not central to this discussion of the ability of trustees to
alter amounts paid to trust beneficiaries and are therefore not discussed in detail in this
Article. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT, arts. 3-4, 7B U.L.A. 141 (1997). The Act in-
cludes rules for apportionment at the beginning and end of an income interest, special
rules for types of receipts like timber and natural resources, and more. See id.
130. See Turnipseed, supra note 10, at 247.
131. Avishai Glikman, The New Uniform and Principal and Income Act: Friend or Foe?, 31
McGEORGE L. REv. 463, 473 (2000) (concluding that although the Uniform Principal and
Income Act "raises the standard of care because it requires trustees to incorporate modern
portfolio theory in their investment strategies," it "is an important step toward bringing
estate planning into the twenty-first century. . [and] should modernize the administra-
tion of trusts for years to come").
132. Suzanne W. Doggett, The Trustee's Power to Invest and to Adjust-"Attended by No
Small Degree of Anxiety and Trouble," 27 TAX MGMT. EST., GiFrs & TR. J. 200 (July 11, 2002).
133. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 141 (1997).
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stagnant requirements of a unitrust election. 134 The discretionary na-
ture of the power to adjust is also useful when the assets of the trust do
not lend themselves to a distribution of principal in a certain year, for
example, when the assets are illiquid.13 5
Importantly, the power to adjust applies to a substantial base of
trusts: those that define payments to beneficiaries based on income.
Many other tools for balancing the interests of trust beneficiaries are
far more limited in scope, applying only to charitable trusts or those
in a small number of states. The widespread enactment of the power
to adjust and the relative commonality of its application across differ-
ent states will allow the development of case law and fiduciary prac-
tices to fine tune the boundaries of this rule.
B. Unitrusts
Another approach that softens the conflict between income and
remainder beneficiaries is the use of a unitrust. In a unitrust, the in-
come beneficiary receives a payment based on a percentage of the fair
market value of the trust's assets, rather than a state law definition of
trust accounting income. 136 This approach allows the trustee to invest
for total return without regard to producing a certain level of income
as it is traditionally defined by state law. Trustees in many states have
the option of converting traditional "income" trusts to unitrusts under
enabling legislation, either the state's Principal and Income Act or
separate legislation. Trustees in states that are slower to adopt this ap-
proach may still attain unitrust treatment through court intervention
or drafting.
Several states include a section in their state Principal and In-
come Act that allows trustees to determine the amount payable to cur-
rent income beneficiaries based upon a percentage of fair market
value: a unitrust election. 13 7 Statutory unitrusts are growing in popu-
larity, and as of 2004, seventeen states have enacted unitrust legisla-
tion. 138 There is no uniform unitrust act, but there is a fair degree of
conformity across the states on the critical provisions of the legisla-
134. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-705 (West 2003), with UNIF. PRINCIPAL &
INCOME Ac-T § 104(b).
135. See Robert B. Wolf, Estate Planning with Total Return Trusts: Meeting Human Needs
and Investment Goals Through Modern Trust Design, 36 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 169, 269
(2001) [hereinafter Wolf, Estate Planning].
136. See Horn, supra note 35, at 30.
137. See infra app. B, which lists the states that have enacted unitrust legislation and the
statutory reference for each state.
138. See id.
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tion. Maine's statute is fairly representative and is discussed as an ex-
ample below. 139
Under Maine law, a trustee may elect to convert a trust to a uni-
trust without court intervention, provided that the beneficiaries are
given notice and an opportunity to object. 140 The trustee may make
the conversion only if it determines that the conversion will improve
the ability of the trustee to carry out the intent of the settlor and the
purposes of the trust.' 41 The unitrust election is an alternative to the
power to adjust under the Principal and Income Act; the options are
mutually exclusive. 142
After a trust is converted to a unitrust, the term "income" in the
terms of the trust means an annual distribution equal to four percent
of the net fair market value of the trust's assets, whether such assets
would be considered income or principal, averaged over the lesser of
the three preceding years or the period during which the trust has
been in existence. Thus, if over the past three years the net fair mar-
ket value of a trust account is $1,000,000, and the trust is converted
into a unitrust, the trustee would distribute $40,000 (4%) to the in-
come beneficiaries. 143 A trustee who has converted a trust to a unitrust
must follow an investment policy seeking a total return for the invest-
ments held by the trust, whether the return is to be derived from ap-
preciation of capital, from earnings and distributions from capital, or
from both. 14 4
The statute sets forth several factors that the trustee should con-
sider when deciding whether to convert to a unitrust. 145 As in the Uni-
139. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-705 (West 2003).
140. Id. § 7-705(a) (2).
141. Id. § 7-705(a)(1).
142. Id. § 7-705(a).
143. Id. § 7-705(d) (3).
144. Id. § 7-705(d)(1).
145. Id. § 7-705(c). The factors are listed as follows:
(1) The nature, purpose, and expected duration of the trust;
(2) The identity and circumstances of the beneficiaries and, to the extent reason-
ably known to the trustee, the needs of the beneficiaries for present and future
distributions authorized or required by the terms of the trust;
(3) The needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation and apprecia-
tion of capital;
(4) The assets held in the trust; the extent to which they consist of financial as-
sets, interests in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal prop-
erty or real property; and the extent to which an asset is used by a beneficiary;
(5) Whether and to what extent the terms of the trust give the trustee the power
to invade principal or accumulate income or prohibit the trustee from invading
principal or accumulating income, and the extent to which the trustee has exer-
cised a power from time to time to invade principal or accumulate income;
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form Principal and Income Act, the list of factors is not exclusive, and
a trustee is expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances
of the trust and its beneficiaries.1 46
Certain trusts are not eligible for conversion to a unitrust under
Maine's Act. A trust may not be converted if the terms of the docu-
ment expressly prohibit the conversion. 147 Several other circum-
stances render a trust ineligible for unitrust conversion under Maine's
Act, generally because the Legislature wanted to guard against unfa-
vorable tax consequences.148 As further protection against unwanted
tax consequences, the Act allows a trustee the ability to release its
power to convert a trust to a unitrust, either permanently or for a
limited time. 149
Court intervention is available to (1) select a payout percentage
other than 4%; (2) provide for a distribution of net income, as would
be determined if the trust were not a unitrust, in excess of the unitrust
distribution if such distribution is necessary to preserve a tax benefit;
(3) average the valuation of the trust's net assets over a period other
than three years; or (4) reconvert from a unitrust. 150 The court may
(6) The actual and anticipated effect of economic conditions on principal and
income and effects of inflation and deflation; and
(7) The anticipated tax consequences of the conversion.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 7-705(a).
148. Id. § 7-705(i). Maine's Act provides:
A trustee may not convert a trust into a unitrust if any of the following applies:
(1) Payment of the unitrust distribution would change the amount payable to a
beneficiary as a fixed annuity or a fixed fraction of the value of the trust assets;
(2) The unitrust distribution would be made from any amount that is perma-
nently set aside for charitable purposes under a will or the terms of the trust
unless both income and principal are so set aside;
(3) The trustee's possession or exercise of the power to convert would cause an
individual to be treated as the owner of all or part of the trust for income tax
purposes, and the individual would not be treated as the owner if the trustee did
not possess the power to convert;
(4) The trustee's possession or exercise of the power to convert would cause all
or part of the trust assets to be included for estate tax purposes in the estate of an
individual who has the power to remove a trustee or appoint a trustee, or both,
and the assets would not be included in the estate of the individual if the trustee
did not possess the power to convert;
(5) The conversion would result in the disallowance of an estate tax or gift tax
marital deduction that would be allowed if the trustee did not have the power to
convert; or
(6) the trustee is a beneficiary of the trust.
Id.
149. Id. § 7-705(k).
150. Id. § 7 -7 05(g).
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also intervene if the beneficiaries disagree as to whether the trustee
should make the unitrust election.15 1
The Act clarifies that a conversion to a unitrust does not affect a
provision in the terms of the trust directing or authorizing the trustee
to distribute principal or authorizing a beneficiary to withdraw a por-
tion or all of the principal.15 2 It also provides guidance on the proper
participation of co-trustees, 53 the administrative details that may be
determined within the trustee's discretion, 54 and appropriate princi-
pal and income allocations under the unitrust model. 155
Some states have an approach to the unitrust alternative that is
more flexible than the Maine Act, allowing a range of unitrust per-
centages rather than a set number. For example, Florida offers its
trustees a range of reasonable choices: a trustee may select a percent-
age between 3% and 5%.156 Trustees who are not "disinterested"-
who may be biased to select a higher or lower number within that
range based upon their own stake in the matter-are guided to an
objective number within that range by referring to the Applicable Fed-
eral Rate for that month, as defined in section 7520 of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 57 Delaware, likewise, allows trustees to select a per-
centage within a 3% to 5% range. 158
Unitrust statutes need not be part of a state's Uniform Principal
and Income Act. New York includes its unitrust provision as part of its
Prudent Investor Act, rather than its Principal and Income Act.159
New Hampshire enacted a separate unitrust statute, the Uniform
Trustee's Power Act,160 and has not enacted the 1997 Uniform Princi-
pal and Income Act. Unitrust statutes that are not part of a state's
Principal and Income Act retain the basic elements of a unitrust ap-
proach. For example, New Hampshire's unitrust statute incorporates
151. Id. § 7-705(b).
152. Id. § 7-705(h).
153. Id. § 7-705(j).
154. Id. § 7-705(e).
155. Id. § 7-705(f).
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 738.1041 (West Supp. 2004).
157. Section § 738.1041 (2) (b) (2) (a) provides:
The percentage used to calculate the unitrust amount is 50 percent of the appli-
cable federal rate as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7520, in
effect for the month the conversion under this section becomes effective and for
each January thereafter; however, if the percentage calculated exceeds 5 percent,
the unitrust percentage shall be 5 percent and if the percentage calculated is less
than 3 percent, the unitrust percentage shall be 3 percent ....
158. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3527 (2003).
159. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 11-2.1 (McKinney 2004).
160. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 564-A:3-c (2003).
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no provisions of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, but allows
trustees to define income as an annual distribution equal to 5% of the
net fair market value of the trust's assets as determined at the end of
the calendar year. 161 This applies regardless of whether such assets
otherwise would be considered income or principal averaged over the
lesser of the three preceding years or the period during which the
trust has been in existence.' 62
In states that have not yet adopted unitrust legislation, trustees
may petition the court to alter the definition of income for a particu-
lar trust. The right of the judiciary to reform a trust in this manner
often rests on an argument of changed circumstances or other equita-
ble concerns. A petition to reform an income trust to a unitrust often
uses similar language as the unitrust statutes-explaining that income
is to be defined as a set percentage of fair market value and including
administrative provisions. When a petition to reform an income trust
to a unitrust involves unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, a guard-
ian ad litem must be involved, and persuading the guardian of the
advantages to remaindermen as well as income beneficiaries will be
key to the success of the conversion. 163
Trustees should be aware that converting an income trust to a
unitrust through judicial intervention may cause tax problems. In Cot-
tage Savings Association v. Commissioner,64 the Supreme Court held that
a loss or gain can be recognized when parties exchange similar prop-
erty. 165 In this case, banks swapped mortgages that were very similar in
substance and economic value, and the court found that the banks
recognized capital gain on the swap. 166 Similarly, in Evans v. Commis-
sioner,16 7 the Tax Court found a taxable exchange when a beneficiary
received a fixed annuity in a trust in return for her income interest. 68
The recent regulations to section 643 of the Internal Revenue Code
have alleviated the concern that statutory unitrust conversions will
trigger capital gains tax, but the regulations are not clear that the
161. Id.
162. See id. § 564-A:3-c(IV)(c).
163. See ERIC P. HAYES ET AL., ADVANCED ISSUES ON TRUST ADMINISTRATION, TOTAL RE-
TURN UNITRUSTS, § 4, at 213-33 (MCLE Inc. 2003) (providing an excellent example of a
guardian ad litem's report agreeing to convert to a 4.5% unitrust; the reports of Thomas P.
Jalkut of Nutter, McClennan & Fish, included with his permission in this volume).
164. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
165. See id. at 567-68.
166. Id. at 568.
167. 30 T.C. 798 (1958).
168. See id. at 807.
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same protection is afforded to judicial reformations. 169 Massachusetts
practitioners have noted anecdotally that the Cottage Savings issue has
been a point of contention for the IRS when it has been asked to
grant favorable rulings on judicial conversions to unitrusts. 170
For practitioners who are fortunate enough to be in the planning
stages rather than being faced with an irrevocable document, drafting
a trust to pay the lead beneficiary a unitrust interest rather than trust
accounting income may be an excellent option to consider.17 1
The primary benefit of converting an income trust to a unitrust is
that it consolidates the investment objectives of the current and future
beneficiaries and enables the trustee to invest for total return. The
amount to be distributed is objective and, presumably, fair. This may
appeal to beneficiaries, particularly those who tend toward less coop-
erative relationships with each other. The unitrust, as opposed to the
power to adjust or other more variable balancing techniques, provides
a reasonable amount of predictability to current beneficiaries, al-
though, of course, there may be variations in the market value from
year to year.1 72 The unitrust is also simpler and more straightforward
to administer for a trustee-and arguably requires less judgment and
169. See Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1 (2004). With respect to non-statutory unitrust conver-
sions, the regulation provides in relevant part:
A switch to a method not specifically authorized by state statute, but valid under
state law (including a switch via judicial decision or a binding non-judicial settle-
ment) may constitute a recognition event to the trust or its beneficiaries for pur-
poses of section 1001 and may result in taxable gifts from the trust's grantor and
beneficiaries, based on the relevant facts and circumstances.
Id.
170. Epic P. HAYES ET AL., Advanced Issues on Trust Administration, Modifying Trusts
§ 2, at 70 (MCLE Inc. 2003). The Cottage Savings issue is not a threat for tax-exempt trusts,
making judicial intervention a more appealing approach for trustees of charitable trusts
seeking to reform to a unitrust absent an enabling statute. In Massachusetts, where there is
no Principal and Income Act and no unitrust statute (although both have been proposed),
judicial reformation has been a fairly common and successful approach for charitable
trusts. See HAYES ET AL., supra note 163, at 213-33.
171. See Collins & Stampfli, supra note 11, at 205; Patrick J. Collins et al., Financial
Consequences of Distribution Elections from Total Return Trusts, 35 REAL. PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
243, 246-66 (2000); James P. Garland, The Problens with Unitrusts, J. PRIVATE PORTFOLIO
MGsmT. (Spring 1999). Commentators, such as Robert Wolf and his associates, have written
eloquently about the role of unitrusts. Mr. Wolf's series of articles, often discussed at the
Annual University of Miami Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning, provide valu-
able detail and quantitative analyses supporting the total return unitrust approach. See
Wolf, Estate Planning, supra note 135; Wolf, Defeating the Duty, supra note 36; Robert B. Wolf,
Total Return Trusts-Can Your Clients Afford Anything Less?, 33 REAL. PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
131, 134-35 (1998).
172. Smoothing rules, which average the fair market value over several years, can help
minimize this volatility. For an example of a unitrust smoothing rule, see N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 564-A:3-c(IV) (c) (2003).
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expertise-than techniques that require the repeated exercise of a
discretionary power.
The unitrust approach, however, does have several drawbacks.
Many trustees believe the percentages expressed in the statutes are
too high to be sustainable over the long term,1 73 and some mourn
their loss of discretionary control. 174 Judicial intervention is generally
needed to opt out of a unitrust once the trustee has opted in,17 5 and
this procedure may be time-consuming and expensive. The unitrust
model may also be inappropriate for certain types of trusts, including
those listed in the statutes, 176 trusts with illiquid assets, spendthrift
trusts, and trusts subject to generation-skipping transfer tax. 177 The
unitrust is also inappropriate for private foundation trusts or other
trusts subject to section 4942 of the Internal Revenue Code, unless the
unitrust percentage is high enough to allow the trustees to meet the
minimum distribution of approximately 5%.178
Judicial unitrusts have even more drawbacks than statutory uni-
trust elections. In addition to the legal fees for drafting the petition,
the involvement of guardians ad litem or representatives of charities,
including the state attorney general or other charitable officials, may
add further expense. Furthermore, the judicial process is not quick,
and a petition may take months or years to make it through the
docket. Tax concerns, most notably fear of triggering capital gain tax
under Cottage Savings, also dampen enthusiasm for judicial unitrusts,
except for where charitable trusts that are protected from such taxes
are at issue.
C. The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
Charitable trusts have an additional tool that is not available to
private trusts. The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
("UMIFA") represents an attempt to provide a balance between in-
come needs and preservation of capital for trustees of charitable
173. Some commentators have suggested that the consensus of the estate planning
community is that a payout range between 3% and 5% should, over time, be sustainable.
See Zaluda, supra note 6, at 155; Turnipseed, supra note 10, at 244 (suggesting that most
trustees believe the common 4% statutory unitrust amount is too high in this investment
return environment, and that in 2003, many were using the power to adjust to pay out
between 3.25% and 3.5%).
174. See Turnipseed, supra note 10, at 244.
175. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7 -7 05(g) (West 2003).
176. See, e.g., id. § 7-705(i).
177. See Turnipseed, supra note 10, at 244.
178. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2002).
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trusts. 17 9 When the statute was drafted, there was a concern that chari-
table organizations were investing their endowments too conserva-
tively.1 80 "The UMIFA solution was to give universities the power to
invest under a more liberal prudent person rule and to allow colleges
to use either the traditional principal and income rule or a total re-
turn standard when making annual spending decisions. ' 181 Since be-
ing introduced in 1972, UMIFA has been adopted by forty-six states. 18 2
UMIFA was promulgated in 1972 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 183 It was intended to provide
guidance to the governing boards of charitable institutions with re-
spect to investing their endowments and other funds. 184 Before
UMIFA was drafted, the law was uncertain and many governing boards
erred on the side of conservatism for fear of liability. 185 UMIFA was
designed as a "rational solution to these problems." 186
UMIFA applies to charitable organizations and to trusts held for
charitable institutions as long as the trustee is also a charitable institu-
tion. 187 Section 2 establishes the following spending rule for institu-
tions covered by UMIFA:
The governing board may appropriate for expenditure for the uses
and purposes for which an endowment fund is established so much
of the net appreciation, realized and unrealized, in the fair value of
the assets of an endowment fund over the historic dollar value of
the fund as is prudent under the standard established by Section 6.
This Section does not limit the authority of the governing board to
expend funds as permitted under other law, the terms of the appli-
cable gift instrument, or the charter of the institution. 188
This section allows the governing board to spend capital appreciation
and does not limit them to spending income. 189 As a result, they can
179. See Halbach, supra note 5, at 1912.
180. See Dobris, supra note 103, at 52.
181. Id.
182. See UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACr § 1, 7A U.L.A. 475 (West Supp.
2004) (table of jurisdictions).
183. See Carol G. Kroch, UMIFA, SJ039 ALI-ABA 27, 29 (Dec. 2003). This action by the
NCCUSL is merely a recommendation. The uniform act must then be adopted by individ-
ual states before it has any binding authority. See Halbach, supra note 5, at 1881.
184. See UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS AcT prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 476
(1972).
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See id. § 1, at 484.
188. Id. § 2, at 491.
189. See id. § 2 cmt., at 491.
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invest for overall return, consistent with the total return theory dis-
cussed in Part II.B above.1 90
For example, a trustee of a $1,000,000 charitable trust with an
original funding amount of $600,000 and a 2% ($20,000) return on
income-producing investments may rely on UMIFA to make distribu-
tions in excess of trust accounting income by appropriating a reasona-
ble amount (say $25,000) from the appreciation of the corpus for
current distribution. The trustee could then distribute to the income
beneficiary the trust accounting income ($20,000) plus the amount
appropriated from the appreciation of the corpus ($25,000), for a
greater total distribution ($45,000). When exercising discretion, the
trustee will be guided by limits in applicable state statutes.
UMIFA emphasizes that section 2 does not apply if it contravenes
a donor's intention.1 9 ' This section is interpreted strictly so that a gov-
erning board can employ UMIFA unless the instrument expressly pro-
hibits the spending of appreciation. A restriction is not implied
merely where an instrument limits spending to income or interest or
requires preservation of principal. 19 2
UMIFA also provides the governing board with guidance with re-
spect to investment policies. 193 Section 4 makes it clear that the gov-
erning board of a charitable institution is not subject to the same
limitations imposed on private trustees.' 94 This broad power provides
that they may
invest and reinvest an institutional fund in any real or personal
property deemed advisable by the governing board, whether or not
it produces a current return, including mortgages, stocks, bonds,
debentures, and other securities of profit or nonprofit corpora-
tions, shares in or obligations of associations, partnerships, or indi-
viduals, and obligations of any government or subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.19 5
This section also gives the governing board the authority to retain
any investments contributed by a donor and invest in a pooled or
common fund maintained by the institution or any other pooled or
common fund, such as "regulated investment companies, mutual
funds, common trust funds, investment partnerships, real estate in-
vestment trusts, or similar organizations."'19 6 UMIFA also provides that
190. See id. at prefatory note, at 476.
191. Id. § 3, at 491.
192. Id.
193. See id. § 4, at 495.
194. See id. § 4 cmt., at 495.
195. Id. § 4(1), at 495.
196. Id. § 4(4), at 495.
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the governing board may delegate investment decisions to other
members of the institution and hire outside professional advisors to
make decisions. 19
7
The entirety of UMIFA, and in particular the spending rule of
section 2, must be read in conjunction with section 6, which imposes a
standard of prudence for all of the governing board's actions.
1 9 8
Thus, the governing board is required to
exercise ordinary business care and prudence under the facts and
circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision. In so
doing they shall consider the long and short term needs of the
institution in carrying out its educational, religious, charitable or
other eleemosynary purposes, its present and anticipated financial
requirements, expected total return on its investments, price level
trends, and general economic conditions. 199
This standard of care is based on the rules applicable to managers of
private foundations and is more similar to the conduct required of
corporate officers as opposed to trustees. 20 0 It "requires a member of
a governing board to weigh the needs of today against those of the
future."20 1
The comments to UMIFA note that restricted gifts may pose a
problem if they become impractical to administer.20 2 Section 7 per-
mits a governing board to release a restriction with the written con-
sent of the donor.20 3 If the donor is unavailable, the governing board
may apply in court for a release. 20 4
In 2002, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws formed a committee to revise UMIFA in light of the UPIA
and the Uniform Trust Code.20 5 The most recent draft issued by the
committee is dated August 25, 2004 (referred to hereinafter as the
"2004 Draft UMIFA"). 2 06 The committee continues to meet, and it is
expected that the revision will not be finished before the end of
197. See id. § 5, at 498. This was a significant departure from the law of private trusts in
1972. Compare UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 498 (1972), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
198. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6, 7A U.L.A. 500 (1972).
199. Id.
200. See id. § 6 cmt., at 500.
201. Id.
202. See id. § 7 cmt., at 503.
203. See id. § 7(a), at 503.
204. See id. § 7(b), at 503.
205. See Kroch, supra note 183, at 29.
206. A copy of the draft can be found at the website of the NCCUSL. See NCCUSL,
2004 ANNUAL MEETING APPROVED TEXT OF THE FINAL ACTS Now AVAILABLE LINK, at http://
www.nccusl.org (last accessed Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter DRAFT UMIFA].
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2005.207 The most recent draft makes several major changes to
UMIFA.20s
A critical change made by the 2004 Draft UMIFA is the broaden-
ing of the definition of institutions covered by the Act to encompass
all charitable trusts, regardless of the identity of the trustee. 209 It
would apply to split interest trusts, such as charitable remainder trusts,
only if the noncharitable interests have terminated. 210 This new provi-
sion has already been enacted by several state legislatures-even
before the next version of UMIFA becomes final. 211 Thus, third party
trustees (including banks and professional fiduciaries) are now oper-
ating under UMIFA in several states.
Perhaps the most controversial proposal introduced by the 2004
Draft UMIFA is a new spending rule to replace former section 2 of
UMIFA.212 Instead of historic dollar value, the 2004 Draft UMIFA
gives the institution the discretion "to expend or accumulate so much
of an endowment fund as the institution determines to be prudent for
the uses, benefits, purposes, and duration for which the endowment
fund is established."2 13 In exercising this discretion, the institution is
subject to a standard of prudence. 21 4 The institution is instructed to
consider certain factors, which are similar to the factors set out in the
prudence standard of the UPIA. 215 As in the current UMIFA statute,
donor intent takes precedence over this spending rule.2 16 The draft
rule grants institutions more flexibility in making expenditures be-
207. See Memorandum from Susan Gary, to Members of the Drafting Committee and
Observers (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/Aug
2004memo.htm (last accessed Jan. 9, 2005).
208. Compare UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDs ACT, 7A U.L.A. 484 (1972), with
DRAFT UMIFA, supra note 206.
209. See DRAFr UMIFA, supra note 206, § 2(4). The American Bankers Association has
recommended that the drafting committee should not include the provision extending
UMIFA to all charitable trusts. See Letter from Lisa J. Bleier, Senior Trust Counsel, Ameri-
can Bankers Association Trust Counsel Committee, to Susan Gary and Carol Kroch (De-
cember 3, 2004) (on file with U.S.F. Law Review).
210. See id.
211. See 13 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 4100 (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 292-B (2004).
212. DRaFr UMIFA, supra note 206, § 4 cmt.
213. Id. § 4(a).
214. See id.
215. See id. The factors are listed as follows: the duration and preservation of the en-
dowment fund; the purposes of the institution and the endowment fund; general eco-
nomic conditions; the possible effect of inflation or deflation; the expected total return
from income and the appreciation of investments; other resources of the institution; and
the investment policy of the institution. Id.
216. See DRAF-r UMIFA, supra note 206, § 4(b).
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cause the drafting committee believed that institutions were still
spending too conservatively under the current standard.217 It is nota-
ble that some states that have already adopted the 2004 Draft UMIFA
provision extending the reach of the Act to third party trustees have
declined to include the provision removing the reference to historic
dollar value. 218 A recent memo from the Reporter of the Drafting
Committee acknowledges that some commentators are concerned
about the potential adverse effects of eliminating the historic dollar
value rule and notes that the revision of the spending rule is still an
open issue.219
The standard of conduct found in UMIFA section 6 has also been
revised to be consistent with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.2 20
This section provides that those responsible for investing and manag-
ing an institutional fund shall act "with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances."221 Like the new spending rule, this section also provides a
long list of factors that should be considered.222 The 2004 Draft
UMIFA continues to permit delegation of management and invest-
ment functions, but has been reworded so that it is almost identical to
section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.2 23 Finally, the 2004
Draft UMIFA also makes it easier for an institution to obtain a release
of restrictions on a gift.22 4
UMIFA, in its current form and as it is poised for progress, pro-
vides important opportunities for trustees of charitable trusts when
balancing current and future interests. The ability to appropriate ap-
217. See id. § 3 cmt.
218. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 4100 (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292-B
(2004).
219. See Memorandum from Susan Gary, supra note 207. The memorandum states:
A number of those commenting on the Act continue to be concerned that with-
out greater guidance in the Act, charities will be tempted to spend more than is
prudent. The Drafting Committee has also heard the concern that attorneys gen-
eral will have difficulty regulating imprudent spending without a bright-line rule.
Id.
220. See DRAyr UMIFA, supra note 206, § 3 cmt.
221. Id. § 3(a)(2).
222. See id. § 3(e).
223. Compare UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, with DRAFT UMIFA, supra note 206, § 5.
224. DRAFT UMIFA, supra note 206, § 6 and cmt. In addition to the rule that a restric-
tion may be released with consent of a donor, the 2004 Draft UMIFA would also permit an
institution to release restrictions on small gifts that have been in place for over twenty years
without applying to a court. The draft suggests that this section should apply to funds of
$25,000 or less. For larger gifts, the institution may apply to a court for cy pres, but need not
notify the donor. Id.
Winter 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
preciation or accumulate income enables a trustee to invest for total
return while still meeting beneficiary needs. UMIFA is flexible enough
that most large charities have developed their own spending policies,
which are consistent with UMIFA and function within its frame-
work.2 25 In the states that have extended its reach beyond institutions
managing their own funds, third party trustees using UMIFA are likely
to find that sophisticated charitable beneficiaries are familiar with
UMIFA and comfortable operating under its terms.
Making distribution adjustments using UMIFA does have some
drawbacks. The appropriation of appreciation is tied to historic dollar
value-a piece of information that is simply not available for some
trusts, particularly older ones. Some argue that the reliance on his-
toric dollar value is antiquated and bears no reasonable relationship
to the current value of the trust.226 Additionally, distributions under
UMIFA may vary substantially from year to year; this allows adjustment
based in part upon charitable needs, but provides less certainty for
income beneficiaries than distributions based upon a set percentage
amount.
D. Private Foundation Tax Compliance Statutes
Trustees of private foundation trusts have an additional method
to transfer more than mere trust accounting income to the current
beneficiary: state statutes enabling compliance with Federal Tax Code
requirements imposed on private foundations. These statutes, while
not allowing the flexibility of an adjustment power or UMIFA appro-
priation, do allow a trustee to invest for total return without com-
pletely sacrificing the beneficiary's need for current income because
they permit the limited distribution of principal.
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1969,227 private foundations have
been subject to a series of tax rules that govern their investment and
distribution practices. 228 One of these rules is section 4942 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which requires that private foundations meet a
minimum distribution requirement of roughly 5% of the foundation's
225. See Dobris, supra note 103, at 51-53.
226. See Memorandum from Susan Gary, supra note 207.
227. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
228. "Private foundation" is defined in section 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
See I.R.C. § 509(a) (2004).
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net assets each year. 229 Foundations that do not comply with this re-
quirement risk loss of their tax-exempt status, 230 or penalties and fees,
or both. 23'
Many charitable trusts that are classified as private foundations
are drafted as income-only trusts, and strict compliance with the terms
of the trust would trigger violations of section 4942 and the resultant
penalties.232  To protect private foundations-particularly those
drafted before the 1969 Act-from the dire consequences of the pri-
vate foundation tax rules, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
enacted legislation authorizing trustees to comply with the private
foundation Tax Code requirements. 233 This legislation is acknowl-
edged by the Internal Revenue Service and is effective to allow trust-
ees to comply with the Tax Code requirements. 234 It applies to the vast
majority of private foundation trusts, although those with clear gran-
tor intent to the contrary may continue to operate under their in-
come-only terms and accept the concomitant tax penalties.2 35
Most of these state statutes were enacted shortly after the 1969
Act (between 1969 and 1972) and were based on the model statutory
229. Technically, the amount a private foundation must distribute is not exactly 5% of
its fair market value. The foundation must instead distribute an amount based on its "mini-
mum investment return." See I.R.C. § 4942(d) (2004). I.R.C. § 4942(e) provides:
[T]he minimum investment return for any private foundation for any taxable
year is 5 percent of the excess of-(A) the aggregate fair market value of all assets
of the foundation other than those which are used (or held for use) directly in
carrying out the foundation's exempt purpose, over (B) the acquisition indebted-
ness with respect to such assets.
Foundations may also carry forward or set aside amounts in calculating this distribution. See
id. However, the distribution amount is roughly five percent of the foundation's fair mar-
ket value, and that shorthand will be used for the purposes of this Article. For an excellent
summary of the mandatory distribution rules of section 4942, see BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE
LAw OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 11.4(b), at 266-67 (7th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001).
230. I.R.C. § 508(e) allows an exemption from tax only for private foundations that
distribute 5% or more of their assets each year. See I.R.C. § 508(e) (2004).
231. I.R.C. § 4942(a) imposes a penalty tax of fifteen percent on foundations that fail
to meet their minimum distribution requirement. See I.R.C. § 4942(a) (2004).
232. See Thomas J. Brorby, Using State Law to Amend Foundations' Governing Instruments
Under 508(e), 34J. TAX'N 170, 170 (1971).
233. Rev. Rul. 75-38, 1975-1 C.B. 161, provides a list of states that have enacted private
foundation tax compliance statutes. This Revenue Ruling is attached infra as Appendix D.
For more background on the enactment of state statutes authorizing private foundation
trustees to comply with the requirements of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, see Brorby, supra
note 232, at 170; Lauren W. Cesare, Private Foundations and Public Charities-Termination
(§507) and Special Rules (§508), 877 TAx MGMT. PORTFOLIOS A-27 (2d ed., BNA 2001);
Marion Fremont-Smith, Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on State Supervision of Charities, 8
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 537 (1971).
234. See Rev. Rul. 75-38; Treas. Reg. § 1.508-3(d).
235. See Cesare, supra note 233, at A-27.
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language advanced by the American Bar Association. 23 6 The language
in the Connecticut statute, for example, is based on the American Bar
Association model language, 23 7 and states:
In the administration of any trust which is a private foundation or a
charitable trust, as defined in subdivision (1), during the period
while it is such a foundation or trust, amounts shall be distributed
for the purposes specified in the trust instrument, in such manner
and at such times as are at least sufficient to avoid liability for the
tax imposed by Section 4942 of said code.238
The purpose of these statutes was to allow compliance with the
Tax Reform Act of 1969-but an important side effect is that they
allow distribution of principal from income-only trusts, thus mitigat-
ing the conflict between investing for trust accounting income and
principal. The 5% minimum distribution requirement of section 4942
of the Internal Revenue Code essentially transforms these income-
only trusts into quasi-unitrusts-requiring distribution of principal to
the extent trust accounting income is insufficient to meet the finan-
cial target. This enables total return investing.
The private foundation tax compliance statutes allow countless
foundations to avoid needless penalty taxes, but their scope is limited
to trusts that are classified as private foundations. The statutes also
contain no flexibility or discretion-additional distributions are per-
mitted only to the extent needed to meet the distribution require-
ment of section 4942, down to the dollar.
Another weakness of private foundation tax compliance statutes
is the uncertainty of the Tax Code section it supports: section 4942. As
charitable organizations come under increased scrutiny, reform of the
tax rules that apply to them seems likely. The 5% distribution require-
ment of section 4942 may be increased or redefined, and the rules
applying to private foundations may be changed dramatically. 239 State
statutes may need to be amended to reflect changes in the federal tax
laws.
236. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 233, at 547-48.
237. SeeJ. Danford Anthony, Private Foundation Governing Instrument Requirements: 1971
Connecticut Public Acts Nos. 219 and 220, 46 CONN. B.J. 287, 299 (1972).
238. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-281 c(a) (2) (2003).
239. See SENATE FINANCE COMM., DISCUSSION DRAFT: REFORMS AND BEST PRACTICES IN
TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/testi
mony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf (last accessed Sept. 28, 2004) (discussing various reforms
to tax-exempt organization rules).
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E. A Unique State-Specific Approach-Section 8113 of the
Pennsylvania Statutes
The four main statutory schemes discussed above are not the ex-
clusive methods of allowing trustee distribution flexibility. States may
also, of course, enact their own creative solutions. This Article reviews
one unique approach in detail. Pennsylvania, as part of its Principal
and Income Act, includes a provision specific to charitable trusts that
allows "income" to be defined as an amount between 2% and 7% of
the fair market value of the trust each year, with the percentage
amount determined annually. 240 Rather than requiring a set unitrust
percentage that endures for the life of the trust, this statute enables
the trustee to adjust the amount based on prevailing circumstances at
the time of the distribution.
240. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8113 (West 2004). This statute is part of Penn-
sylvania's Principal and Income Act and provides as follows:
(a) Election.-Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the trus-
tee of a trust held exclusively for charitable purposes may elect to be governed by
this section unless the governing instrument expressly provides that the election
provided by this section shall not be available.
(b) Eligibility for election.-To make an election under this section, the trustee
shall adopt and follow an investment policy seeking a total return for the invest-
ments held by the trust, whether the return is to be derived from appreciation of
capital or earnings and distributions with respect to capital or both. The policy
constituting the election shall be in writing, shall be maintained as part of the
permanent records of the trust and shall recite that it constitutes an election to be
governed by this section.
(c) Effect of election.-If an election is made to be governed by this section, the
term "income" shall mean a percentage of the value of the trust. The trustee shall,
in a writing maintained as part of the permanent records of the trust, annually
select the percentage and determine that it is consistent with the long-term pres-
ervation of the real value of the principal of the trust, but in no event shall the
percentage be less than 2% nor more than 7% per year. The term "principal"
shall mean all other assets held by the trustee with respect to the trust.
(d) Revocation of election.-The trustee may revoke an election to be governed
by this section if the revocation is made as part of an alternative investment policy
seeking the long-term preservation of the real value of the principal of the trust.
The revocation and alternative investment policy shall be in writing and main-
tained as part of the permanent records of the trust.
(e) Value determination.-For purposes of applying this section, the value of the
trust shall be the fair market value of the cash and other assets held by the trustee
with respect to the trust, whether such assets would be considered "income" or
"principal" under the other provisions of this chapter, determined at least annu-
ally and averaged over a period of three or more preceding years. However, if the
trust has been in existence less than three years, the average shall be determined
over the period during which the trust has been in existence.
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This statute is an interesting hybrid of a unitrust statute and
UMIFA. Since Pennsylvania has no UMIFA, section 8113 functions, in
part, as a UMIFA substitute. It is notable that Pennsylvania does have
both the power to adjust 241 and a straight 4% unitrust statute, 242 but
apparently the legislature felt these two options were insufficient for
charitable trusts. The comments to the statute by the Pennsylvania leg-
islature are illuminative:
The law governing charitable trusts does not currently permit the
trustees to adopt a "spending policy" in connection with the man-
agement of endowment or other trust funds on a "total return"
basis. In any situation where the trust is required to spend "in-
come", all dividends and interest must be expended, none can be
added to principal even in years in which the income is extraordi-
narily high. On the other hand, realized capital gains must all be
allocated to principal, even in years in which the ordinary dividend
and interest yield is low.
The percentages stated reflect a judgment as to the range of
"yields" within which a spending policy may be appropriate. The
upper limit is actually more than would be considered prudent in
long-term management of a trust. Nevertheless, some flexibility
should be allowed so the trustees can adjust to the specific needs of
a charity from time to time. A limit at the low end is proposed to
ensure that, in cases where the trust requires the current expendi-
ture of income, the trustee cannot subvert this requirement by de-
fining income to be zero.
The above rules are necessary only in connection with trusts which
state that only the income can be expended currently. Trusts which
allow the application of both principal and income can be man-
aged on a total return basis in any event.
243
Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Legislature believed that this spe-
cial charitable quasi-unitrust option would be of no use to private
foundations, which already had a private foundation tax compliance
statute. Section 8113 states:
[C] haritable trusts that are private foundations for Federal income
tax purposes already have the ability to expend "principal" to the
extent provided in section 1 of the act of June 17, 1971 (P.L. 181,
No. 23). Accordingly, this provision will provide needed flexibility
primarily to those charitable trusts that are not private
foundations. 244
241. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8104 (West 2004).
242. Id. § 8105.
243. Id. § 8113 cmt.
244. Id.
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Although the Pennsylvania statute is creative and flexible, its lim-
ited scope-to Pennsylvania charitable trusts that are not private foun-
dations-makes it an option that is generally unavailable to trustees.
State-specific approaches also counter the goal of uniformity of law in
different jurisdictions and run the risk of becoming obscure and un-
derutilized. Approaches that are used by only one state also have less
opportunity to be tested and to develop supporting case law to help
trustees learn the boundaries of the statute.
III. A Comparison of the Alternatives and an Example of
Their Application
Fortunate trustees may find themselves with several tools that
they could choose to alter the amount paid to the current beneficiary.
Which tool is best? The following hypothetical will examine the four
options available in Maine to a private trust and to a charitable trust:
the power to adjust, the unitrust, UMIFA, and the private foundation
tax compliance statute. Each option will be examined independently
with attention to the impact it will have on the trust distribution
amount.
Assume that the same bank acts as the trustee for two trusts that
were funded in 1975 with $600,000 and are currently valued at
$1,000,000. The first trust is an irrevocable private trust that provides
that all of the income is to be paid to the grantor's second wife for life
with the remainder to the grantor's children from his first marriage.
The second trust is a charitable trust that directs all of the income to
be paid to a local charity in perpetuity.2 45 Both trusts are invested for
total return, with 20% in bonds and 80% in equities. Last year, each
trust produced a 2.0% return in income ($20,000) and a 7.0% return
($70,000) on its equity investments, and this is consistent with its per-
formance over the past several years. The income beneficiaries have
expressed a need for a greater payout this year. What options does the
trustee have in determining the amount to pay, and what tools work
best?
245. Depending upon the other terms of the trust, it might qualify as either a sup-
porting organization under I.R.C. § 509(a) (3) or a private foundation under I.R.C.
§ 509(a) (4). Even though an income-only trust would not by its terms comply with the
distribution requirements of a private foundation under federal tax law, the local private
foundation tax compliance statute will enable the trustee to meet these requirements. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.508-3(d) (2004) & Rev. Rul. 75-38, 1975-1 C.B. 161. Careful drafters of
private foundation trusts, however, generally will comply with the tax requirements in the
document itself rather than relying on corrective legislation.
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Table 1
Options Available to a Trustee in Maine
Available for Charitable Available for Charitable
and Private Trusts Trusts Only
Exercise the Convert to a Appropriate Distribute
power to adjust. unitrust. appreciation principal under
under UMIFA. the private
foundation tax
compliance
statute.
ME. REV. STAT. ME. REV. STAT. ME. REV. STAT. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A ANN. tit. 18-A ANN. tit. 13 ANN. tit. 18-A
§ 7-704. § 7-705. § 4102. § 7-407.
Allows trustee to Allows trustee to Allows trustee to Allows trustee to
allocate receipts elect to convert appropriate distribute
or expenses to a 4% appreciation in principal to
allocated to unitrust. light of historic meet the 5%
income under dollar value.2 46  distribution
trust accounting requirement of
rules to § 4942 of the
principal, or U.S. Tax Code.
vice versa.
If the trustee chose to apply the power to adjust under the Princi-
pal and Income Act, it would apply the factors listed in the Maine
statute and attempt to determine what additional distribution is
needed to be "fair and reasonable" to the beneficiaries given the
trust's investment approach and all relevant circumstances. Arriving at
a precise number would be no small feat. Should the trustee scrutinize
particular items of income or expense and determine whether they
should be reallocated? Should the trustee estimate what would be a
reasonable return to which the income beneficiary is entitled? Should
the trustee determine what a sustainable payout would be as a per-
centage of corpus, or a range of sustainable payouts and decide upon
an amount to transfer based on that number? Would it be helpful to
analogize to the New Jersey statute and presume that a distribution in
the range of 4% to 6% of the trust's fair market value is reasonable?
There are no clear answers and no clear guidance-trustees operating
246. Note that Maine's Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act does not set a
percentage limitation on the amount of appropriation that would be prudent. See 13 ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 4100-1 (West 2003). Cf N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292-B (2004)
(suggesting that appropriating amounts above 7% are likely imprudent).
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under the power to adjust have broad discretion, with its accompany-
ing freedom and risks.
Let us assume that the trustee decides, based on all of the rele-
vant factors, that it is defensible under the Principal and Income Act
to pay out an amount between 2% ($20,000; making no adjustment)
and 6% ($60,000). After doing research, the trustee concludes that an
annual distribution of between 3% and 4% would be consistent with
the competing goals of providing for the current needs of the income
beneficiary and preserving principal for the remainder beneficiaries.
Given the beneficiary's expressed needs for current income and the
favorable investment performance of the trust in the past year, the
trustee decides that a payout of $35,000 is best. The trustee transfers
$15,000 from principal to income and distributes this amount to the
income beneficiary in addition to the $20,000 of trust accounting
income.
As an alternative, the trustee may consider converting to a uni-
trust. Again, the trustee must apply the factors listed in the unitrust
statute in light of the trust's circumstances. The statutory unitrust
amount in Maine is 4%, which would entitle the income beneficiary to
a distribution of $40,000. Here, there is no controversy over the distri-
bution amount (unless the parties wish to litigate it), since the
amount is statutorily set. Unfortunately, in exchange for this certainty,
the trustee loses any flexibility to meet the beneficiaries' potential fu-
ture needs.
Both of the above options-the power to adjust and the unitrust
election-are also available to the trustee for the charitable trust. For
a charitable trust, however, the additional opportunities to appropri-
ate appreciation under the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act and/or (if the trust is a private foundation) to utilize the
private tax compliance statute come into play.
With respect to the charitable trust, the trustee may now analyze
what distributions would be proper under the Uniform Management
of Institutional Funds Act. As a bank, the trustee is new to applying
the statute, but the charitable beneficiary has been using it to manage
its own sizable endowment for years. Under UMIFA, the trustee must
first compare the historic value of the trust to its current value, to
determine how much appreciation there is. In our hypothetical, the
trust has grown by $400,000 since its inception. The trustee must then
consider how much of this $400,000 is prudent to appropriate and
distribute, given the factors listed in the UMIFA statute and the cir-
cumstances of the trust. Although Maine's UMIFA statute does not set
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an upper percentage limit on what would be considered prudent, the
trustee may take guidance from New Hampshire's act, which suggests
that an amount beyond 7% ($70,000) is probably not sustainable. The
trustee refers to the research it examined during its contemplation of
the power to adjust and concludes that an annual distribution of be-
tween 3% and 5% would be consistent with the goal of long-term pres-
ervation of principal, since the trust operates in a tax-free
environment and is subject to very low fees.
Given the beneficiaries' expressed needs for current income, the
tax-exempt status of the trust, and the favorable investment perform-
ance of the trust in the past year, the trustee decides that a payout of
$45,000 is best. The trustee is comfortable distributing somewhat
more under UMIFA than under the power to adjust because (1) the
trustee is now taking into account the historic dollar value of the trust
and its healthy growth over the past several decades, and (2) the trus-
tee is comparing its percentage distribution to the ceiling in some
states' UMIFA provisions and charitable endowment practices, rather
than to the percentage safe harbor listed in Principal and Income Act
statutes and the practices of its peers in applying the power to adjust.
The trustee appropriates $25,000 from the appreciation of the corpus
and distributes this amount to the beneficiaries in addition to the
$20,000 of trust accounting income.
Now, let us assume that the charitable trust is classified as a pri-
vate foundation under federal tax law. In this case, the interplay of the
statutes is critical; the private foundation tax compliance statute acts
as a floor, setting a minimum distribution even if the trustee chooses
to increase the payment under a different statute. Maine's private
foundation tax compliance statute will allow the trustee to distribute
the precise amount-and not a dollar more or less-that the trust
needs to avoid penalty taxes under section 4942 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. We will assume that there is nothing complicating the sec-
tion 4942 calculation this year and that the minimum distribution
requirement is 5%: $50,000. The trustee is able to distribute $30,000
from the principal in addition to the $20,000 of trust accounting in-
come to the income beneficiaries.
As our hypothetical shows, the legislative approach the trustee
uses to alter the payment to the income beneficiaries determines
whether there is a range of possible distribution amounts or one set
figure. Whereas some options (the power to adjust and UMIFA) offer
a flexible range, other options (unitrust and private foundation tax
compliance statutes) are more rigid. The power to adjust and UMIFA
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approaches may result in a different range of distribution amounts
because the factors the trustee is considering will vary and it will be
comparing itself to a different peer group. The chart below shows the
facts of our hypothetical, including the high and low ranges available
under each approach and the amount our fictional trustee actually
chose.
$80,000
$70,000
$60,000
-= $50,000
. $40,000
4 $30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$_
Adjustment Unitrust UMIFA P.F. Tax Comp.
Approach
Note that there is a good deal of overlap in the payment range
attainable under the four separate statutes. The trustee could have
decided upon a distribution of $50,000 under the adjustment power,
the private foundation tax compliance statute, or UMIFA. It could
have decided upon a distribution of $40,000 under the adjustment
power, the unitrust, or UMIFA. It is also interesting to note that the
trustee is more likely to distribute a greater amount from the charita-
ble trust than from the private trust. Although the trust's tax-exempt
status has some effect on the decision, it does not totally account for
the disparity. Why is a trustee more likely to spend a higher percent-
age from a trust that was probably intended to survive over a longer
time span? One possibility is that in the context of a charitable trust
there is an acceptance that the duty to protect principal does not nec-
essarily include a duty to protect against the effects of inflation. 247
Most states do not offer their trustees all of these legislative ap-
proaches, but many states offer more than one, particularly for chari-
table trusts. Trustees must consider not only what amount of
additional income would be fair, but also what statutory approach best
enables the trustee to reach that goal. Careful trustees who wish to
document their discretionary distribution choices may wish to use a
checklist of factors that should be considered under the applicable
statute. Because these factors vary somewhat, a trustee must be
thoughtful in selecting its approach and insure that its actions are
247. Haskell, supra note 25, at 93.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
consistent with the statute it is relying upon, even though the same
dollar distribution could possibly be reached under a different statute.
IV. Changes for the Future
When looking at the variety of statutes available that enable a
trustee to balance the entitlements of future and present interests, a
few points are striking. First, trust law has come a long way in a short
time, but some states lag dramatically behind their peers in enacting
legislation necessary to empower their trustees. Second, UMIFA offers
unique opportunities to a small class of trusts, but that class may be-
and should be-expanding.
The speed at which some states have adopted enabling legislation
is surprising. Trust law is generally more of a marathon than a sprint,
but in this case many states have been prompt to enact legislation that
allows trustees to keep up with modem investment ideals. The current
version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act was made final in
1997, and, in less than seven years, the vast majority of U.S. jurisdic-
tions have enacted it.248 Unitrust statutes, which are younger still, have
already swept across seventeen states.2 49 The Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act also continues to expand, extending its reach
to non-institutional trustees in the current draft and in several state
statutes.250 Although the development of trust law on this subject has
been uncharacteristically rapid, it has not yet reached its full maturity.
As striking as the rapidity of progress of uniform acts and of some
state legislatures to develop enabling statutes is the stark contrast with
states that have done little or nothing to provide several alternatives.
Some states, like Maine, allow trustees a generous menu of tools to
balance beneficiary interests. Trustees have the flexibility they need to
choose the approach best suited for a particular trust. Other states,
like Massachusetts, offer no statutory solutions for non-charitable
trustees.
The difference in the availability of options leads to forum shop-
ping. Trustees managing trusts in jurisdictions without necessary legis-
lation are examining the terms of their documents to determine if a
change in situs is available at the prompting of sophisticated benefi-
ciaries. States that do not wish to lose trust accounts (and the fiduciary
248. See infra app. A.
249. See infta app. B.
250. See infta app. C; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 4100; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292-
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taxes they pay) to other states should enact legislation to put them on
a par with their peers.
States in particular should focus on extending the reach of
UMIFA to non-institutional trustees, as suggested in the 2004 Draft
UMIFA. UMIFA and the power to adjust under the Uniform Principal
and Income Act have much in common. They both allow a trustee to
distribute either more or less than strict trust accounting income.
They both provide a similar list of factors to consider in deciding how
much to distribute. They both enable a trustee to invest for total re-
turn without sacrificing the current needs of the income beneficiary.
UMIFA, however, has been tried and tested over the past several de-
cades, and therefore has allowed guidance to develop on the bounda-
ries of the rule. Institutions are familiar with its rules and can
cooperate with their third party trustees to develop an effective en-
dowment management approach. The charities benefit from the flexi-
bility of the statute and its facilitation of total return investing,
regardless of whether they are the trustees themselves or whether a
third party manages the fund for their benefit.
Consideration might also be given to extending some of the con-
cepts of UMIFA to non-charitable trusts. The distinction in treatment
of charitable and non-charitable trusts may have arisen in part be-
cause charitable trusts were often intended to be perpetual, while per-
sonal trusts were bound by the rule against perpetuities. As the rule
against perpetuities erodes and dynasty trusts increase in popularity,
however, it is more common for personal trusts to share the goal of
endurance that charitable trusts have historically held. 251 The concept
of making such distributions as are prudent with the long-term sur-
vival of the fund-and perhaps the technique of capping distributions
with reference to historic dollar value-may be useful in a private
trust setting.
Not all of the progress need be legislative. As the creators of trust
documents, drafting attorneys are in a unique position to make the
best possible use of the tools available for enabling flexibility in distri-
butions. Attorneys in states without helpful statutes should consider
analogizing to other states' Principal and Income Act, unitrust statute,
or UMIFA provisions.
251. See Building Your Own Dynasty-States Toss Out Restrictions On Creating Perpetual
Trusts; Downside-Fees Last Forever, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at 1.
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Conclusion
Trustees in every state should have access to a wide menu of statu-
tory options for balancing the needs of trust beneficiaries. Trust law is
rapidly catching up with modern investment practices and theories.
As it does, trustees should be granted the tools they need to master
the delicate task of pleasing current and future trust beneficiaries. A
wide range of statutory techniques for balancing the financial interests
of trust beneficiaries allows trustees to rise to the challenge of being
fair and reasonable.
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APPENDIX A
States That Have Enacted the Uniform Principal and
Income Act (1997)-As Listed in
Uniform Laws Annotated*
Jurisdiction Laws Effective Date Statutory Citation
Alabama 2000, Act 675 1-1-2001 Code 1975, §§ 19-3A-101
to 19-3A-605.
Alaska 2003, c. 145 9-1-2003 AS §§ 13.38.200 to
13.38.990.
Arizona 2001, c. 176 1-1-2002 A.R.S. §§ 14-7401 to 14-
7431.
Arkansas 1999, Act 647 1-1-2000 A.C.A. §§ 28-70-101 to 28-
70-605.
California 1999, c. 145 1-1-2000 West's Ann. Cal. Probate
Code §§ 16320 to 16375.
Colorado 2000, c. 257 7-1-2001 West's C.R.S.A. §§ 15-1-401
to 15-1434.
Connecticut 1999, P.A. 1-1-2000 C.G.S.A. §§ 45a-542 to 45a-
542ff.
District of 2001, D.C. 4-27-2001 D.C. Official Code, 2001
Columbia Law 13-292 Ed. §§ 28-4801.01 to 28-
4806.02.
Florida 2002, c. 42 1-1-2003 West's F.S.A. §§ 738.101 to
738.804.
Hawaii 2000, c. 191 7-1-2000 HRS §§ 557A-101 to 557A-
506.
Idaho 2001, c. 261 7-1-2001 I.C. §§ 68-10-101 to 68-10-
605.
Indiana 2002, c. 84 1-1-2003 West's A.I.C. §§ 30-2-14-1
to 30-2-14-44
Iowa 1999, H.F. 7-1-1999 I.C.A. §§ 637.101 to
584 637.701.
Kansas 2000, c. 61 7-1-2000 K.S.A. §§ 58-9-101 to 58-9-
603.
* Unif. Principal & Income Act References & Annots. (West Supp. 2004), 7B U.L.A.
131 (1997). Given the Principal and Income Act's continuing progress in many
jurisdictions, print lists become outdated quickly. To determine whether a state has
enacted the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act, visit the website of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=60. See also LEIMBERG & LEC-AIR, supra note 108.
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Maine 2002, c. 544 1-1-2003 18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 7-701 to
7-773.
Maryland 2000, c. 292 10-1-2000 Code, Estates and Trusts,
§§15-501 to 15-530.
Minnesota 1969, c. 1006 1-1-1970 M.S.A. §§ 501B.59 to
501B.76.
Missouri 2001, H.B. 7-10-2001** V.A.M.S. § 469.401 to
241 469.467.
Montana 2003, c. 506 4-25-2003** MCA §§ 72-34-421 to 72-
34-453.
Nebraska 2001, LB 56 9-1-2001 R.R.S.1943, §§ 30-3116 to
30-3149.
Nevada 2003, c. 355 10-1-2003 NRS 164.700, 164.780 to
164.925.
New Jersey 2001, c. 212 1-1-2002 NJ.S.A. 3B:19B-1 to
3B:19B-31.
New Mexico 2001, c. 113 7-1-2001 NMSA 1978, §§ 46-3A-101
to 46-3A-603.
New York 2001, c. 243 1-1-2002 McKinney's EPTL 11-A-1.1
to 11-A-6.4.
North 2003, c. 232 1-1-2004 G.S. §§ 37A-1-101 to 37A-
Carolina 6-602.
North Dakota 1999, c. 532 8-1-1999 NDCC 59-04.2-01 to 59-
04.2-30.
Ohio 2002, No. 12-9-2002 R.C. §§ 1340.40 to
186 1340.91.
Oklahoma 1998, c. 115 11-1-1998 60 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 175.101
to 175.602.
Oregon 2003, c. 279 6-10-2003** ORS 116.007, 129.200 to
129.450.
Pennsylvania 2002, c. 50 5-16-2002** 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8101 to
8191.
South 2001, c. 80 7-18-2001 Code 1976, §§ 62-7-401 to
Carolina 62-7-432.
Tennessee 2000, c. 829 7-1-2000 T.C.A. §§ 35-6-101 to 35-6-
602.
Texas 2003, c. 659 1-1-2004 V.T.C.A. Property Code§§ 116.001 to 116.206.
** Date of Approval.
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Virginia 1999, c. 975 1-1-2000 Code 1950, §§ 55-277.1 to
55-277.33.
Washington 2002, c. 345 1-1-2003 West's RCWA 11.104A.001
to 11.104A.905.
West Virginia 2000, c. 273 7-1-2000 Code, 44B-1-101 to 44B-6-
604.
Wyoming 2001, c. 11 7-1-2001 Wyo.Stat.Ann. §§ 2-3-801
_ 1 to 2-3-834.
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APPENDIX B
States That Have Enacted Unitrust Statutes*
State Statute
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 13.38.200 (Michie 2004).
Colorado CoLo. REv. STAT. 15-1-402 (2003).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3527 (2004).
Florida FLA. STAT. § 738.1041 (West 2004).
Illinois 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5 (2004).
Iowa IOWA CODE § 637-101 (2003).
Kentucky Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 386.454 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 7-704 (2003).
Maryland MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN., ch. 478 § 15-501 (2004).
Missouri Mo. REv. STAT. § 469.411 (2004).
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §564-A:3-c (2004).
New York N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW §11-2.1 (McKinney 2004).
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37A-1-101 (2004).
Pennsylvania 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8101 (West 2004).
South Dakota 15 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 55-15-1 (Michie 2004).
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 55-277.40 (Michie 2004).
Washington WASH. REV. CODE § 11.101 (2004).
* Created with reference to http://www.leimberg.com/freeResources/truStates.asp
#ma. Given the continuing progress of unitrust statutes in many jurisdictions, print lists
become outdated quickly. See LEIMBERG & LECLAIR, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX C
States That Have Enacted the Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act (1972)-As Listed in Uniform
Laws Annotated*
Jurisdiction Laws Effective Date Statutory Citation
Alabama 1993, 1st Ex. 8-31-1993 Code 1975, §§ 16-61A-1 to
Sess. No. 93- 16-61A-8.
899
Arkansas 1992, No. 70 3-20-1992 A.C.A. §§ 28-69-601 to 28-
69-611.
California 1973, c. 950 9-30-1973 West's Ann. Cal. Probate
Code §§ 18500 to 18509.
Colorado 1973, c. 126 West's C.R.S.A. §§ 15-1-
1101 to 15-1-1109.
Connecticut 1973, P.A. 7-1-1973 C.G.S.A. §§ 45a-526 to 45a-
73-548 6-11-1973 534.
Delaware 1974, c. 572 7-29-1974 12 Del.C. §§ 4701 to 4708.
District of D.C.Laws No. 4-6-1977 D.C. Official Code, 2001
Columbia 1-103 Ed. §§ 44-1601 to 44-1609.
Georgia 1984, p. 831 3-28-1984 O.C.G.A. §§ 44-15-1 to 44-
15-9.
Hawaii 1995, Act 46 4-25-1995 H R S §§ 517D-1 to 517D-
11.
Idaho 1996, c. 405 7-1-1996 I.C. §§ 33-5001 to 33-5008.
Illinois 1973, P.A 78- 10-1-1973 S.H.A. 760 ILCS 50/1 to
866 50/10.
Indiana P.L. 268-1989 4-26-1989** West's A.I.C. 30-2-12-1 to
30-2-12-13.
Iowa 1990, 3-29-1990** I.C.A. §§ 540A.1 to 540A.9.
S.F.2350
Kansas 1973, c. 226 7-1-1973 K.S.A. 58-3601 to 58-3610.
Kentucky 1976, c. 115 6-19-1976 KRS 273.510 to 273.590.
Louisiana 1976, No. 7-31-1976** LSA-R.S. 9:2337.1 to
410 9:2337.8.
Maine 1993, c. 371 6-16-1993** 13 M.R.S.A. §§ 4100 to
4110.
* Unif. Mgmt. of Institutional Funds Act § 1, 7A
(table of jurisdictions).
** Date of Approval.
U.L.A. 233 (West Supp. 2004)
Winter 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Maryland 1973, c. 838 7-1-1973 Code, Estates and Trusts,
§§ 15-401 to 15-409.
Massachusetts 1975, c. 886 1-17-1976** M.G.L.A. c. 180A, §§ 1 to
11.
Michigan 1976, P.A. 6-17-1976 M.C.L.A. §§ 451.1201 to
157 451.1210.
Minnesota 1973, c. 313 8-1-1973** M.S.A. §§ 309.62 to
309.71.
Mississippi 1998, c. 417 7-1-1998 Code 1972, §§ 79-11-601 to
79-11-617.
Missouri 1976, p. 745 V.A.M.S. §§ 402.010 to
402.060.
Montana 1973, c. 389 3-20-1973** MCA 72-30-101 to 72-30-
207.
Nebraska 1996, L.B. 3-19-1996** R.R.S. 1943, §§ 58-601 to
973 58-609.
Nevada 1997, c. 281 7-3-1997 N.R.S. 164.500 to 164.630.
New 1973, c. 9-1-1973 RSA 292-B:1 to 292-B:9.
Hampshire 547:1
NewJersey 1975, c. 26 3-5-1975 N.J.S.A. 15:18-15 to 15:18-
24.
New Mexico 1997, c. 199 7-1-1997 NMSA 1978, §§ 46-9-1 to
46-9-12.
New York 1978, c. 690 7-25-1978 McKinney's N-PCL, §§ 102,
512, 514, 522.
North 1985, c. 98 7-1-1985 G.S. §§ 36B-1 to 36B-10.
Carolina
North 1975, c. 182 7-1-1975 NDCC 15-67-01 to 15-67-
Dakota 09.
Ohio 1975, p. 303 11-26-1975 R.C. §§ 1715.51 to
1715.59.
Oklahoma 1992, c. 131 9-1-1992 60 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 300.1 to
300.10.
Oregon 1975, c. 707 9-13-1975 ORS 128.310 to 128.355.
Rhode Island 1972, c. 260 541972 Gen.Laws 1956, §§ 18-12-1
to 18-12-9.
South 1990, Act 7-1-1990 Code 1976, §§ 34-6-10 to
Carolina No. 390 34-6-80.
Tennessee 1973, c. 177 5-7-1973 T.C.A. §§ 35-10-101 to 35-
10-109.
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Texas 1989, c. 213 5-26-1989 V.T.C.A. Property Code,
§§ 163.J01 to 163.009.
Utah 1997, c. 242 5-5-1997 U.C.A. 1953, 13-29-1 to 13-
29-8.
Vermont 1973, No. 59 7-1-1973 14 V.S.A. §§ 3401 to 3407.
Virginia 1973, c. 167 3-10-1973** Code 1950, §§ 55-268.1 to
55-268.10.
Washington 1973, c. 17 6-7-1973** West's RCWA 24.44.010 to
24.44.900.
West Virginia 1979, c. 60 6-8-1979 Code, 44-6A-1 to 44-6A-8.
Wisconsin 1975, c. 247 5-15-1976 W.S.A. 112.10.
Wyoming 1991, c. 75 7-1-1991 Wyo.Stat.Ann. §§ 17-7-201
to 17-7-205.
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APPENDIX D
States That Have Enacted Private Foundation Tax
Compliance Statutes-As Recognized by the IRS in
Revenue Ruling 75-38*
'January,1975
Private foundations; governing instruments; State laws enacted. States that have
adopted legislation satisfying the requirements of section 508(e) of the Code, relating to
private foundation governing instruments, are listed; Rev. Rul. 73-286 superseded.
The purpose of this Revenue Ruling is to identify those States that have been
held by the Internal Revenue Service to have adopted legislation satisfying
the requirements of section 508(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
relating to private foundations.
Under section 508(e) of the Code, a private foundation (as defined in sec-
tion 509) is not exempt from Federal income tax under section 501 (a) unless
its governing instrument contains certain provisions. These provisions, gener-
ally, must require or prohibit, as the case may be, the foundation to act or
refrain from acting so that it will not be liable for the taxes imposed by sec-
tions 4941, 4942, 4943, 4944, and 4945.
Section 1.508-3(d) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that a private
foundation's governing instrument is deemed to conform with the require-
ments of section 508(e) of the Code if valid provisions of State law have been
enacted which:
(1) Require it to act or refrain from acting so as not to subject the founda-
tion to the taxes imposed by sections 4941 (relating to taxes on self-dealing),
4942 (relating to taxes on failure to distribute income), 4943 (relating to
taxes on excess business holdings), 4944 (relating to taxes on investments
which jeopardize charitable purpose), and 4945 (relating to taxable expendi-
tures), or
(2) Treat the required provisions as contained in the foundation's governing
instrument.
The States listed below have enacted statutory provisions that satisfy the re-
quirements of section 508(e) of the Code. Therefore, the governing instru-
ments of private foundations under the jurisdiction of these States are
generally considered to have been amended as required by section 508(e).
* Rev. Rul. 75-38, 1975-1 C.B. 161.
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However, provisions of these statutes vary widely. For this reason, the nota-
tions following the State listing are important.
ALABAMA-except where otherwise provided by a decree of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction or by a provision in the private foundation's governing
instrument which in either case has been entered or made after October 1,
1971, and expressly limits the applicability of State law.
ALASKA-except for such private foundations which expressly provide in
their governing instruments that the applicable sections of Alaska law do not
apply to them.
ARKANSAS-except for such private foundations which expressly provide in
their governing instruments that the applicable sections of Arkansas law do
not apply to them and except in the case of trusts where otherwise provided
by decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
CALIFORNIA-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
COLORADO-with respect to trusts that are private foundations except
where otherwise provided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
CONNECTICUT-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
DELAWARE-except for such private foundations which expressly provide in
their governing instruments that the applicable sections of Delaware law do
not apply to them.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-except for such corporations which expressly
provide in their governing instruments that the applicable sections of District
of Columbia law do not apply to them and except in the case of trusts where
otherwise provided by a court of competent jurisdiction. (For purposes of
this statute, corporations include corporations organized under any Act of
Congress applicable to the District of Columbia as well as corporations organ-
ized under the laws of the District of Columbia.)
FLORIDA-except for such trusts which file a proper election not to be sub-
ject to the applicable provisions of Florida law and for such corporations as to
which a court of competent jurisdiction has otherwise determined.
GEORGIA-except for such private foundations which file a proper election
not to be subject to such law.
HAWAII-no exceptions.
IDAHO-except for such private foundations which expressly provide in
their governing instruments that the applicable sections of Idaho law do not
apply to them.
ILLINOIS-except for such corporations which have express provisions to
the contrary in their articles of incorporation and except for trusts where it is
otherwise provided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
INDIANA-except where otherwise determined by a court of competent ju-
risdiction with respect to private foundations organized before January 1,
1970.
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IOWA-except for such private foundations which expressly provide in their
governing instruments that the applicable sections of Iowa law do not apply
to them.
KANSAS-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
KENTUCKY-except, with respect to corporations in existence on July 1,
1972, to the extent that such a corporation provides to the contrary by
amendment to its articles of incorporation adopted after July 1, 1972, and,
with respect to trusts in existence on July 1, 1972, where action is properly
commenced on or before December 31, 1972, in a court of competent juris-
diction to excuse the trust from compliance with the requirements of section
508(e) of the Code.
LOUISIANA-except for such private foundations which expressly provide
in their governing instruments that the applicable sections of Louisiana law
do not apply to them.
MAINE-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
MARYLAND-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
MASSACHUSETTS-except where otherwise provided by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
MICHIGAN-with respect to trusts that are private foundations except for
such private foundations which file a notice of inconsistency under Michigan
law.
MINNESOTA-except for private foundations that have been held by a court
of competent jurisdiction not to be affected by such State statute.
MISSISSIPPI-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
MISSOURI-except for private foundations that have been held by a court of
competent jurisdiction not to be affected by such State statute.
MONTANA-except in the case of trusts where otherwise provided by court
decree entered after March 28, 1974, and except in the case of a corporation
which has an express provision to the contrary in its articles of incorporation.
NEBRASKA-except for such trusts which effectively elect to be excluded
from the applicable sections of Nebraska law, for such corporations which
have governing instruments expressly providing to the contrary, and except
as a court of competent jurisdiction has otherwise determined in any given
case.
NEVADA-no exceptions.
NEW HAMPSHIRE-except where it is otherwise provided by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction.
NEW JERSEY-except for such private foundations which expressly provide
in their governing instruments that the applicable sections of New Jersey law
do not apply to them.
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NEW YORK-except where such law conflicts with any mandatory direction
of an instrument by which assets were transferred prior to June 1, 1971, and
such conflicting direction has not been removed legally.
NORTH CAROLINA-except for such private foundations which expressly
provide in their governing instruments that the applicable sections of North
Carolina law do not apply to them and except for trusts that have their gov-
erning instruments reformed by a decree of the Superior Court of North
Carolina.
NORTH DAKOTA-with respect to trusts that are private foundations except
where otherwise provided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
OHIO-except in the case of trusts where it is provided otherwise by a court
of competent jurisdiction and except in the case of corporations in existence
on September 17, 1971, which expressly adopt contrary provisions in their
governing instruments after September 17, 1971.
OKLAHOMA-except for such private foundations which file a proper elec-
tion not to be subject to such law.
OREGON-no exceptions.
PENNSYLVANIA-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
RHODE ISLAND-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SOUTH CAROLINA-except for private foundations which expressly pro-
vide in their governing instruments that the applicable sections of South Car-
olina law do not apply to them.
SOUTH DAKOTA-except where otherwise provided by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
TENNESSEE-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
TEXAS-except for such private foundations which file a proper election not
to be subject to such law.
UTAH-with respect to trusts that are private foundations except where oth-
erwise provided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
VERMONT-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
VIRGINIA-except for private foundations whose governing instruments
contain express provisions to the contrary or which have filed a proper elec-
tion not to be subject to such law.
WASHINGTON-except for such private foundations which expressly pro-
vide in their governing instruments that the applicable sections of Washing-
ton law do not apply to them.
WEST VIRGINIA-with respect to trusts that are private foundations except
for such trusts which provide in their governing instruments that the applica-
ble sections of West Virginia law do not apply to them.
WISCONSIN-except as may otherwise be provided by decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
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WYOMING-except where otherwise provided by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Rev. Rul. 73-286, 1973-2 C.B. 188 is hereby superseded."
